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The United States Marine Corps is operating in an increasingly resource-limited 
and fiscally constrained environment while simultaneously becoming more dependent on 
information technology systems to efficiently train and operate. Balancing budget and 
mission requires innovative solutions to current problems. One such innovation that could 
potentially save the Marine Corps money, while increasing its ability to prepare for and 
conduct its mission, is the use of commercial mobile devices.  
This research used case study methodology to describe three processes that could 
benefit from the implementation of commercial mobile devices in the Marine Corps. 
Each independent case study was presented with three courses of action with 
implementation strategy variations. Socio-technical systems theory was used to analyze 
the intersection between the proposed new technology and the user. The technology 
acceptance model was used to analyze the likelihood of actual usage based on 
implementation strategy used. Finally, each course of action was analyzed with regard to 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of organizational data. 
The conclusion of this research is that no “one-size-fits-all” implementation 
strategy of these devices will minimize risks and maximize benefits in all processes. This 
is likely due to the variations in confidentiality, integrity, and availability requirements of 
each process. 
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In the 21st century, the United States Marine Corps (USMC) faces an increasingly 
complex geo-political climate while operating in a constrained budgetary environment. 
This situation requires the USMC to “balance fiscal responsibility and mission 
accomplishment” (Nally, 2013). Balancing budget and mission requires innovative 
solutions to current problems. One such innovation that could potentially save the USMC 
money, while increasing the ability to prepare for and conduct its mission is the use of 
commercial mobile devices (CMD). 
Cebrowski and Garstka (1998) identified information technology (IT) as central to 
increasing return on investment (ROI) and competing in the modern economy, and that 
the use of IT would be central to meeting the demands of modern network-centric 
warfare. IT has the potential be a force-multiplier for the Department of Defense (DOD); 
IT also has the potential to be a significant limiter of productivity and effectiveness if 
new technology is not properly implemented. 
The Director of the USMC’s Command, Control, Communications, and 
Computers Department (C4) recognized that: 
The user requirement to access and share information from non-traditional 
workspaces will enable more efficient mission accomplishment. The 
ability to access, share and manipulate data and information from non-
traditional workspaces will afford users with additional freedom of 
movement across and expanding information environment. (Nally, 2013) 
This statement from the USMC Director of C4 directly addresses the Marine 
Corps need for mobility in the IT used by its workforce. Implementing a policy allowing 
CMD technology in the USMC has the potential to increase the mobility and efficiency 
of the workforce while decreasing costs. 
CMD technology implementation has risks associated with legal ownership of 
data and the device itself, as well as issues in terms of security validation of users 
(Anderson, 2013, p. 10). The Marine Corps recognizes that the security of the 
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government network is a key tenet to implementing and realizing the potential benefits of 
this technology (Anderson, 2013, p. 10). From an IT security standpoint, the most secure 
course of action for the DOD could be to forbid the use of CMDs to conduct business. 
This could be the most secure choice, but this choice would deny the affected subordinate 
units the improved efficiency and effectiveness that CMD usage has enabled in other 
organizations. Intel Corporation knew that corporate oversight and security could be 
more easily assured by restricting CMD usage. They also recognized that such a policy 
would make it a less attractive employer in an industry that was seeing increased 
competition for talented employees (Chandrasekhar, 2013, p. 2). 
The Clinger-Cohen Act (1996) directs the continuing assessment of the IT 
management experiences of other government organizations, international organizations, 
and the private sector. This research follows the Clinger-Cohen Act (1996) directive by 
assessing the implementation of CMD policies in a variety of organizations in order to 
better understand how implementation of similar policies could impact the DOD and, 
more specifically, the USMC. Using the experiences of these organizations, this research 
will develop three case studies that illustrate the potential effect CMD technology could 
have in various USMC business processes. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
There is little empirical data concerning the implications of the increased use of 
commercial mobile devices in the United States Marine Corps. This is a problem because 
the United States Marine Corps is operating in an increasingly resource limited and 
fiscally constrained environment while simultaneously becoming more dependent on 
information technology systems to efficiently train and operate. Leveraging the use of 
personally procured computing devices may allow the United States Marine Corps to 
become even more efficient, productive, and better positioned to carry out its mission. 
C. PURPOSE STATEMENT 
The purpose of this research is to explore scenarios where implementation of 
policies allowing the use of commercial mobile devices could allow the United States 
Marine Corps to achieve higher productivity while minimizing IT investment. This is 
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important because the United States Marine Corps now is carrying out more complex 
operations around the world, often under austere conditions. In order to be better 
prepared to conduct these operations, the United States Marine Corps may be able to 
benefit from better understanding how other organizations/companies address the use of 
commercial mobile devices and how United States Marine Corps could possibly 
implement the use of these devices. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis seeks to answer the following questions: 
 What are the organizational and policy implications of using personal 
commercial mobile devices in the Marine Corps? 
 What are the organizational and policy implications of using personal 
commercial mobile devices on completing computer based training? 
 What are the organizational and policy implications of using personal 
commercial mobile devices in scheduling and completing unit level 
training? 
 What are the organizational and policy implications of using personal 
commercial mobile devices in conducting a safety or mishap 
investigation? 
E. RESEARCH GOALS 
The goal of this research is to increase the understanding of how the use of 
commercial mobile devices on Marine Corps networks may be implemented in a manner 
that takes into account confidentiality, integrity, and accessibility. Through the 
development of case studies and the analysis of potential courses of action, this research 
is intended to provide a better understanding of the social and technical implications of 
implementing this technology. The desired end-state of this research is that decision 
makers within the Marine Corps have a better understanding of the risks and benefits 
associated with implementing this technology. 
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II is a discussion of CMD technology, implementation strategies, and the 
Information Systems Strategy Triangle in effort to understand the complexity associated 
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with implementing this technology. This discussion proceeds on into a discussion about 
the strategic focus, and plans and policies of the federal government, Department of 
Defense (DOD), Department of Navy (DON), and the United States Marine Corps 
(USMC) in order to better understand how the organizational and business strategy 
should drive the information strategy. Chapter II goes on to discuss the concepts of the 
sociotechnical systems theory, technology acceptance model, and the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability (CIA) triad in order to provide a framework for analyzing the 
courses of actions developed in Chapter III. 
Chapter III provides three separate case studies, which present particular 
scenarios that could benefit from the implementation of CMD technology through 
application based access. Each case is described in detail, as are the potential uses of 
CMD technology in each particular instance. Each case offers three potential courses of 
action that vary in terms of the implementation strategy and the responsibilities from the 
perspective of the organization and the end user. 
Chapter IV analyzes each case and each course of action with emphasis on the 
risks and benefits in terms of confidentiality, integrity, and availability from the 
perspective of the organization and the end user. Using sociotechnical systems theory and 
the technology acceptance model, this chapter will address the interaction between the 
technology and the individual of each course of action. 
Chapter V is a summary of the research, conclusions, and recommended courses 
of action for the individual cases. The recommendations will provide the reader a better 
understanding of the complex interaction between the individual and the technology. 
Additionally, this chapter offers recommendations for follow-on research in this area of 
study.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Department of Defense (DOD) looks at information, digital or otherwise, as a 
strategic asset, which is a characterization of the way the information used and protected 
(DOD CIO, 2016, p. 2). Certainly any information that is “classified” or that contains 
Personally Identifiable Information (PII) must be safeguarded from exposure to threats as 
described in U.S. laws. However, decreasing or limiting availability of data comes at a 
cost in terms of employee productivity. The current resource limitations and the 
increasing complexity of the threats faced by the DOD could potentially benefit from the 
implementation of a new policy that embraces technology available to employees 
commercially. 
A. COMMERCIAL MOBILE DEVICE TECHNOLOGY 
The United States Marine Corps (USMC) and the wider Department of Defense 
(DOD) operate in a resource-constrained environment. One way that the DOD could 
possibly gain an advantage in this environment is by implementing a policy that allows 
the use of CMDs, either personally owned or government furnished. For the purposes of 
this research, CMDs will be defined as set forth in the Department of Defense 
Commercial Mobile Device Implementation Plan. In this definition, CMDs are described 
as a “subset of portable electronic devices (PED)” that: 
provide one or more commercial wireless interfaces along with a compact 
user input interface (touch screen, miniature keyboard, etc.) and exclude 
PEDs running a multi-user operating system (Windows OS, Mac OS, etc.). 
This definition includes but is not limited to smart phones, tablets, and e-
readers. (DOD CIO, 2013, p. 25) 
CMDs can vary greatly in computing capacity, operating system, and security 
capability. For the purposes of this research, CMDs are characterized as having the 
ability to connect to the Internet, being highly portable, instantly accessible to the user, 
and having similar processing and data storage capability as desktop or laptop systems at 
a lower cost (Tucker, 2010, p. 1). Each of these commonalities of CMDs offers potential 
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benefits to the USMC and DOD in terms of workforce mobility and interconnectedness, 
but they also have potential negative aspects in terms of security of information. 
B. IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY CATEGORIES 
With regard to implementation strategies, four categories of implementation are 
discussed, each having varying positives and negatives from the point of view of the 
employee and that of the enterprise. In Gajar, Ghosh, and Rai (2013, p. 64), the authors 
identified and described each of these implementation strategy categories as Here is Your 
Own Device (HYOD), Choose Your Own Device (CYOD), Bring Your Own Device, 
(BYOD), and On Your Own Device (OYOD). Each of these categories will be discussed 
in detail, with the emphasis on the possible benefits to the DOD and USMC from each. 
These four implementation strategy categories span from low levels of enterprise control 
to higher levels, and from low employee satisfaction to high employee satisfaction, as 
displayed in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.  Implementation Categories. Source: Grajar et al. (2013, p. 64). 
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This research will look at each of these four implementation categories and assess 
the potential benefits and limitations of each using USMC specific case studies. 
a. Here is Your Own Device (HYOD) 
In this implementation category, the organization is responsible for providing the 
CMD. The enterprise has complete control over the device in terms of settings and 
configuration of the device. The organization is responsible for procuring the device, 
setting up the device, maintaining the device (Grajar et al., 2013, p. 64). From the point 
of view of the enterprise, this category provides the most control and leads to the best 
network security, comparatively (Grajar et al., 2013, p. 64). This implementation plan is 
essentially the same as the current DOD and USMC “privileged user” access program. 
In this program, “privileged users” are provided government furnished equipment (GFE) 
if they are identified as “being mission critical or mission essential” (Anderson, 2013, 
p. 11). In Mercado, and Spain (2014, p. 3), the researchers surveyed over 15,000 Active-
duty Army Soldiers on, among other things, their willingness to use an “Army-issued 
smartphone.” The results showed that 80% of respondents would be willing to use 
the smartphone. The various activity usages, broken down by age group, are shown in 
Table 1.  





From a review of Table 1, some interesting insights about potential use of a CMD 
in a HYOD implementation can be determined. First, the older users (Mid-Grade and up 
Officers, and Staff Non-commissioned Officers) show a higher percentage use of the 
CMD for “Personal Organizing” and “Official phone and email,” whereas the younger 
users (Junior Officers, and Enlisted) show a higher percentage use for “Access to online 
training.” This insight into usage could transfer over to the other implementation 
categories. One important consideration is that of “smartphone” ownership among the 
younger age demographics. In Mercado and Spain (2014, p. 7), the researchers 
determined that younger users were more likely to own tablet or e-reader, and less likely 
than their older counterparts to own a “smartphone.” The researchers believed that 
“smartphone” ownership was lower due to the high cost of service contracts in 
comparison to income in this demographic (Mercado & Spain, 2014, p. 23). It is not 
reasonable to expect that everyone owns a CMD, and therefore if a strategy of achieving 
total workforce mobility is desired, then the government will likely have to furnish 
devices or provide a CMD stipend to offset the costs to the user. 
The expansion of the “privileged user” program to include a larger segment of the 
total workforce in the DOD or USMC would mean the government procuring a CMD for 
a larger number of people and then requiring the IT professionals in subordinate units to 
maintain that equipment. This could result in a considerable increase in cost in initial 
procurement, personnel training, and maintenance, as well as the commercial cellular 
access contract. That being the downside of this strategy, the benefit is the amount of 
security and control that the enterprise would have over those devices. In summary, a 
HYOD strategy provides maximum control to the enterprise while allowing the employee 
minimal freedom in choice of CMD, operating system, etc. 
b. Choose Your Own Device (CYOD) 
In this implementation category, the organization provides a portfolio of devices, 
and the employees are given the opportunity to choose the device they prefer (Grajar et 
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al., 2013, p. 64). This strategy capitalizes on the benefits of HYOD, in that the enterprise 
still has control on the portfolio of devices, and not all devices are allowed. Additionally, 
the organization owns the devices and still maintains the security and access allowed. 
This strategy seeks to allow a certain level of choice to the individual employees to pick a 
device that they are more comfortable or familiar with, in order to encourage employee, 
use and efficiency on the device. Mercado and Spain (2014, p. 8) reported that the three 
main smartphone types owned by Active-duty Army Soldiers varied with age, with over 
half of all younger respondents in each age group owning iPhone devices, and that 
percentage dropping steadily as age increased, with the Android devices showing greater 
ownership by older Soldiers. The key take-away from their survey results is that if given 
a choice no specific device would satisfy all customers; however, a portfolio of choices to 
include iPhone, BlackBerry, and Android devices would satisfy the vast majority. This 
strategy would mean additional cost to the enterprise in terms of procuring the devices, as 
well as additional cost in training and staffing an IT department for the capability of 
maintaining multiple CMDs, operating systems, configurations, etc. This cost is expected 
to be outweighed by the added benefit of allowing the employees to pick a device they 
are more comfortable and/or familiar with. 
c. Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) 
In this implementation category, the employee is either given some amount of 
financial resource (stipend) or expected to self-procure a CMD. The key difference from 
other categories is the employee owns the device, and is able to install software or 
applications that are not a violation of the organization policies. The employee is 
expected to maintain the device and the enterprise has less control over configuration, 
although it still has the ability to enforce standards as a pre-requisite for network access 
(Grajar et al., 2013, p. 64). The enterprise is still expected to provide some support to the 
employee in terms of helping the employee with configuration, and troubleshooting 
hardware-software issues that arise in the use of the device. This is riskier to the 
enterprise network, because the possible configurations of devices make the possibility of 
network intrusion much higher. 
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Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) uses a BYOD strategy allowing students to 
operate their personal laptops, tablets, mobile phones, etc., on the network. NPS provides 
support to the students through a self-help wiki website as well as a full staff of IT 
professionals who have knowledge of the various operating systems and devices 
commercially available. The students accessing the network are responsible for procuring 
their own device and complying with usage standards as well as maintaining the currency 
of the anti-malware software that is provided to them. For those students who do not have 
the fiscal means to purchase their own device, the school has a limited number of devices 
to be loaned out as well as community computers available throughout the campus in 
computer labs and the library. 
The NPS BYOD strategy would likely not work on a wide scale in the DOD and 
the USMC because of the risk potential with regard to personally identifiable information 
(PII) and unclassified information that is potentially sensitive when aggregated. Some of 
the potential methods of providing additional security of a BYOD 
implementation, including the use of applications, trusted platform module (TPM), and 
virtual desktop infrastructure (VDI), will be discussed in greater detail in this research. 
d. On Your Own Device (OYOD)
In this implementation category, the employee is given complete autonomy on the 
type of and configuration of the device used to access the organizations network. Under 
this category, the user is responsible for management, maintenance, upgrade cycle, and 
cost with no support from the organization (Grajar et al., 2013, p. 64). “No support” is 
not intended to mean that the organization has no IT personnel; in this case, the 
organization maintains the network and access to the network. Any CMD implementation 
policy must be analyzed from the viewpoints of the enterprise and the employee. In some 
DOD and USMC applications, each of these categories is likely to apply. For example, in 
the case of USMC’s Training & Education Command (TECOM), an OYOD 
implementation plan could allow the largest benefit with the least cost. In this case, 
creating an application, or even a Virtual Desktop that the user could access from their 
personally procured CMD in order to complete computer based annual training or 
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Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) training. This specific case will be discussed in 
greater detail in the following chapters of this research. 
C. INFORMATION SYSTEMS STRATEGY TRIANGLE 
The Information Systems Strategy Triangle framework as developed by Pearlson 
and Saunders (2013, p. 24) is an effective way to analyze the interaction between 
the business, organizational and information strategies in an organization. The use 
of the triangle is important, because it shows how a change in any of the individual 
strategies has effects on the other strategies. The triangle is organized with the business 
strategy at the top of the triangle to show that under optimal circumstances it will be 
the overarching strategy, with the authors asserting that “successful firms have an 
overriding business strategy that drives both organizational strategy and IS strategy” 
(Pearlson & Saunders, 2013, p. 24). 
 
Figure 2.  The Information Systems Strategy Triangle. 
Source: Pearlson and Saunders (2013, p. 24). 
Pearlson and Saunders (2013, p. 27) define the business strategy as “a plan 
articulating where a business seeks to go and how it expects to get there.” For the DOD 
this strategy comes down from the president through the National Security Council and is 
filtered through the echelons of command into what individual organizations within the 
DOD seek to accomplish and how they intend to accomplish their goals. The 
organizational strategy describes the design of the organization, how decisions are made 
in the organization, how coordination is accomplished, and how the work processes are 
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controlled (Pearlson & Saunders, 2013, p. 33). The DOD is recognized as highly 
hierarchical in its organization, but decision authority can be de-centralized in many 
cases, and collaboration and liaison between entities in the organization can vary greatly 
from unit to unit. Due to this organizational complexity, “one-size-fits-all” initiatives do 
not always succeed, and therefore individual organizations strategies must be considered 
when analyzing the Information Systems Strategy Triangle for CMD implementation. 
The information strategy is defined as “the plan an organization uses to provide 
information services” (Pearlson & Saunders, 2013, p. 36). In the DOD, this strategy is 
found in various plans/policies/directives/instructions as published by the DOD CIO and 
subordinate CIO’s or IT professionals. 
Misalignments between the two or more points of the triangle can lead to adverse 
effects on the strategy. In Shives and Pelz (2012, p. 69), the authors looked at the issue of 
organizational culture and structure, specifically the relationship between HQMC C4 and 
the acquisition process within the Marine Corps and how that relationship affects IT 
changes. Their research ultimately determined that significant issues exist in the 
relationship between HQMC C4 and the organizations responsible for acquisition of IT 
resources. These authors specifically determined that while HQMC C4 is responsible for 
developing and implementing the information strategy from the business strategy of the 
Marine Corps, HQMC C4 is not formally included in the acquisition process due to the 
organizational strategy. The authors found that this issue could lead to the acquisition of 
information technology systems that were not aligned with an information strategy that 
supports the business strategy (Shives & Pelz, 2012, p. 69). This is an example of how a 
misalignment between the business strategy and the organizational strategy affects the 
ability to successfully carry out the information strategy. Marine Corps-specific 
implementation would require policy change from HQMC C4; however, the structural 
issues, personnel, and political issues regarding acquisitions could impact 
implementation. The business strategies, organizational strategies, and information 
strategies of the DOD that are relevant to CMD are discussed in greater detail in the 
following section. 
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D. INFORMATION SYSTEMS STRATEGY AND POLICY IN THE DOD 
The United States Marine Corps (USMC) and the wider Department of Defense 
(DOD) operate in a resource-constrained environment (Nally, 2013). These resource-
constraints carry over into the information technology (IT) in the form of fewer and older 
computing devices. In many cases, the number of Marines and Sailors in an operational 
unit can greatly outnumber the computers and Internet connections assigned to that unit. 
These computing devices vary in age and capability from unit to unit. Equipment 
upgrade and replacement timelines are a function of the budget cycle as well as the 
government acquisition process. These IT systems must be seen as a capability multiplier 
that allows the warfighters to train, equip, and complete the missions that support the 
strategic focus of the president, down to the Combatant Commanders. The following sub-
sections will address the strategic focus as well as the many different directives, 
instructions, and memorandums that govern and direct the use and implementation of 
IT systems in the DOD. 
1. Current Strategic Focus of DOD/DON/USMC Applicability 
The strategic focus of the DOD was developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 
following a review of the guidance that is set down by the president and the National 
Security Council (NSC). These strategic focuses are intended to influence the operational 
level and tactical level focus in order to achieve a strategic goal or end-state. As such, the 
strategic level focus will not specify a particular information technology strategy that 
should be pursued; rather, the guidance must be derived through an understanding of the 
capability increase that certain elements of IT may provide. Connecting that potential 
increase in, or added capability to, a strategic area of focus is important to justify the 
allocation of resources to the pursuit of an IT strategy. 
a. Department of Defense (DOD) Areas of Focus 
The National Security Strategy as developed by the president and the National 
Security Council lays down the overall strategic focus for the country (White House, 
2015). This strategy is then reviewed by the JCS and developed into the National Military 
Strategy (Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2015). The Secretary of Defense (SecDef) 
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developed the Quadrennial Defense Review (Secretary of Defense, 2014) in order to 
shape the focus of the DOD. In the National Security Strategy, the president described the 
focus as increasing security and prosperity through the use of all the resources of the 
United States government to include the DOD (White House, 2015). 
The National Military Strategy (2015) discusses the need to seize on innovation 
and efficiencies that will allow the achievement of the strategic objectives. This strategy 
recognizes inherent resource shortfalls that occurred due to budgetary constraints as well 
as the vigorous deployment cycle of the recent future. The need for greater effectiveness 
and efficiency in order to achieve better preparation to conduct the required missions of 
the DOD is a common theme of this strategy (Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2015). The 
greater implementation and usage of IT solutions has the potential to help achieve better 
effectiveness and efficiency for the DOD while addressing some of the budgetary 
constraints that are likely to occur into the future. 
In the Quadrennial Defense Review(QDR), the SecDef discusses many of the 
same issues as the president and JCS such as the need to overcome the budgetary 
shortfalls and achieve greater efficiency. The QDR describes the need for greater 
capability and readiness by the DOD in order to meet the strategic focus, specifically 
looking at modernization and a rebalance of the force to decrease unneeded infrastructure 
(Secretary of Defense, 2014). A shift in IT strategy has the potential to decrease 
infrastructure, and increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the force in the future. 
b. Department of Navy (DON) Areas of Focus
The previously discussed strategies from the DOD leadership are further digested 
and developed into a more Department of Navy-focused strategy, as laid out in the 
Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea power (Secretary of the Navy, 2015). In this 
strategy, many of the main areas of focus from the higher echelon strategies are discussed 
with a greater focus on how the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard are expected to 
utilize their unique capabilities. One main point of this strategy is the need to maintain 
throughout the force a high level of readiness to deploy rapidly to respond to crisis. 
Additionally, this strategy prioritizes affordability and cost control in order to meet 
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budget shortfalls (Secretary of the Navy, 2015). In terms of adding capability, this 
strategy discusses the need to capitalize on the strategic and intellectual capital of the 
service members, which has the potential to benefit from the greater proliferation of and 
usage of mobile devices and specific applications within the DOD. 
c. Marine Corps Areas of Focus 
In terms of the strategic focus of the Marine Corps, the most recent plan is 
Expeditionary Force 21 (EF21) (Commandant of the Marine Corps, 2014). The Marine 
Corps prides itself on being expeditionary, amphibious and on the front lines of any 
conflict that arises. Maintaining high readiness levels, and being prepared to deploy to 
any point of friction quickly in order to achieve the designated objectives is the primary 
focus of the Marine Corps. EF21 specifically describes an intent to improve training and 
organization capability within the Maine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). It also 
specifically lays out the intent to enhance capability with regard to social media, 
information technology, and cyberspace capabilities (Commandant of the Marine Corps, 
2014, p. 11). These areas of focus are, as discussed above, capable of achieving success 
through the implementation of CMD technology in the MAGTF. 
2. Plans and Policies 
In order to understand the many plans, policies, directives, and instructions that 
must be followed in the implementation of any Commercial Mobile Device (CMD) that 
may access DOD information and/or operate on a DOD network, this research begins 
with an examination of the Federal Chief Information Officer (CIO) level issuances and 
then proceeds down the levels of command to the Marine Corps CIO. 
a. Federal CIO 
In Digital Government: Building A 21st Century Platform to Better Serve the 
American People (Federal CIO, 2012), the Federal CIO along with the president 
recognize that technology, and more specifically mobile technology, is an opportunity 
and a challenge. The Federal CIO acknowledged that “early adopters” within the 
government were working toward innovation in mobile usage, but that no over-arching 
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policy or strategy was in place to ensure that innovations were able to apply across the 
disparate organizations of the federal government. 
Digital Government (Federal CIO, 2012) established unifying strategy objectives 
for all of the federal government to enable the mobile workforce to access government 
information “anywhere, anytime, on any device.” It recognizes “customer-centricity” and 
“security and privacy” as two of the major principles of achieving the strategy objectives. 
The Federal CIO explains that the focus should be on mobility and not necessarily mobile 
technology in this way: 
Mobility is not just about embracing the newest technology, but rather 
reflects a fundamental change in how, when, and where our citizens and 
employees work and interact. Mobile technology-the devices, 
infrastructure, and applications required to support a mobile citizenry and 
workforce-is a critical enabler of mobility, but is only part of the profound 
environmental shift that mobility represents. (Federal CIO, 2012, p. 14) 
This focus on mobility rather than the specific technology is an important concept 
that will be discussed in greater detail in the development of the case studies for this 
research. 
b. Department of Defense (DOD) 
The Department of Defense, and more specifically the DOD Chief Information 
Officer (DOD CIO) has the overall responsibility for the coordination of information 
technology between the organizations that make up the DOD. The DOD CIO issues the 
plans and policies that describe the development of and use of information technology to 
meet the needs of the greater DOD. The policies and instructions developed by the DOD 
CIO are more generic in nature and are intended to address issues related to the 
interoperability of DOD IT systems as well as the confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability issues common to all subordinate agencies. Interoperability is recognized by 
the DOD CIO as imperative to the successful implementation of any IT system in the 
current joint, interagency, and/or multinational operating environment (DOD CIO, 2014a, 
p. 3). For the purposes of this research, any systems that “receive, process, store, display, 
or transmit DOD information” are considered DOD IT systems (DOD CIO, 2014b, p. 2). 
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(1) DOD Commercial Mobile Device Implementation Plan 
The DOD Commercial Mobile Device (CMD) Implementation Plan (DOD CIO, 
2103) discussed the need for a phased approach to implementing CMDs in the DOD. It 
specifically discussed the belief that greater mission effectiveness can be achieved 
through the development and proliferation of what it called “secure commercial mobile 
applications.” The plan goes on to describe the four priorities, in terms of unclassified 
access, which the DOD CIO plans to pursue (DOD CIO, 2103). 
The first is priority dealt with providing infrastructure for wireless services. This 
is further described as acquiring contracts for carrier services, monitoring and managing 
the use of those services, and implementing a Mobile Device Management (MDM) 
system to ensure maintenance and security. Also described is the desire to consider 
infrastructure options that reduce costs “to the greatest extent possible.” 
The second priority dealt with the need to determine what devices can meet the 
requirements threshold, in terms of capability and security, and then to approve those 
devices for acquisition and distribution to the forces. 
The third priority discussed the need for a development and certification process 
of mobile applications that may access DOD information and networks, with the main 
focus of this priority being the interoperability of applications with various operating 
systems. 
The fourth priority focused on the need to protect and secure the DOD 
information environment through security approval processes, continuous monitoring to 
ensure policy and configuration compliance, as well as classified CMD plans which goes 
beyond the scope of this research (DOD CIO, 2013). 
The “Future Capability” section of this plan discussed the desire to possibly 
implement a Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) style program that is more like the ones in 
use in the commercial business sector. It went on to describe that this future desired 
capability, while possibly beneficial, is prevented by DOD policies and the potential 
security vulnerabilities. The plan also described that through the use of Virtual Desktop 
Infrastructure (VDI), or Trusted Platform Module (TPM) (either through software or 
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hardware) the DOD may be able to realize the benefits of BYOD in the future (DOD 
CIO, 2013). This research will go into more detail on these solutions and their possible 
use. 
(2) DOD Mobile Device Strategy 
In the DOD Mobile Device Strategy (2012, p. 1), the DOD CIO recognizes 
mobile nature of the DOD workforce. Mobile devices are recognized as improving the 
productivity, and situational awareness of individuals to include members of the DOD. 
The increasing use of social media, smartphones, and tablet computers has 
made information sharing an expectation. Our challenge today is ensuring 
our networks can securely support the information demands of our users – 
users who require access to information anywhere and anytime across the 
DOD Information Enterprise, allowing them to make informed decisions 
in the execution of their missions. (DOD CIO, 2012, p. 2) 
This statement by then DOD CIO, Teresa M. Takai, described the demand for 
mobility, interoperability as well as security in DOD IT systems. 
The first goal described in this strategy discussed the need to further develop 
enterprise infrastructure to support mobile devices, which has a potential to decrease 
overall infrastructure costs in terms of government owned and furnished computers and 
mobile devices. Much like the previously discussed plan, this strategy recognized the 
inherent security issues with mobile devices and the need for Public Key Infrastructure 
(PKI) security to control access (DOD CIO, 2012, p. 3). 
The second goal described in this strategy recognizes the need for formalized 
policies and standards governing the use of mobile devices on the network. Recognizing 
that most CMDs are not appropriately equipped (in terms of security controls, access 
protocols, etc.) for use on a DOD network, this strategy discussed the need for required 
standards in addition to a streamlining of the process to approve CMDs (DOD CIO, 2012, 
p. 3). Central to achieving this goal, the strategy recognized the need for appropriate 
workforce education and training in order to mitigate potentially hazardous employee 
behavior and practices. 
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The third goal described in this strategy is the need for mobile and web-enabled 
applications to provide increased functionality to the users (DOD CIO, 2012, p. 4). This 
topic will be discussed in greater detail in this research. 
One of the main considerations of this implementation strategy is the need to 
identify the type of user using the device and the level of access that is required by that 
user. This research is focused on Unclassified Non-Sensitive information access for 
personal CMD. User categories, the level of access required, and the considerations the 
DOD CIO recognizes as needing to be addressed in the implementation of mobile devices 
are shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3.  Implementation Considerations. Source: DOD CIO (2012, p. 6) 
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This research will address several of these Non-Sensitive Implementation 
Considerations at the Enterprise-wide User Category level, recognizing that the current 
state of mobile device technology and the budgetary constraints in the DOD will have an 
impact on the overall strategy. 
c. Marine Corps 
The Marine Corps Commercial Mobile Device Strategy (2013) is one of the main 
driving factors behind conducting this research. In this strategy, Headquarters Marine 
Corps (HQMC) established the current approach regarding research and development 
of technology and policies to determine the level of implementation that should be 
pursued regarding the use of personally procured mobile devices. It highlights several 
of the currently understood issues with implementation as well the anticipated benefits. 
The anticipated benefits are limited and based on an understanding of the benefits 
other organizations have seen. This strategy also establishes the USMC definition of a 
CMD as: 
a handheld computing device with a display screen that allows for user 
input (e.g., touch screen, keyboard). When connected to a network, it 
enables the sharing of information in formats specially designed to 
maximize the use of information given device limitations (i.e., screen size, 
computing power). (Anderson, 2013, p. 4) 
This strategy additionally looks at the “way forward” for the USMC as 
establishing a secure mobile framework (SMF). It goes on to specifically state developing 
BYOD as one of the ways the USMC will achieve SMF. This strategy sets a goal of 
establishing a mobile environment that allows personally owned CMDs to access 
“controlled unclassified information (CUI),” recognizing the potential benefit in terms of 
“cost efficiency and increased worker effectiveness.” Additionally, it recognizes that 
“legal ownership rights,” and the “security of the MCEN” are challenges that will need to 
be addressed in order for SMF to be realized in the USMC (Anderson, 2013, p. 10). 
Figure 4 graphically displays how, at a very high level, the USMC will develop policy, 
streamline procurement and testing, develop mobile applications and mobile 
infrastructure, all in order to optimize operations (Anderson, 2013, p. 6). 
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Figure 4.  Secure Management Framework, Source: Anderson (2013, p. 6) 
This research is specifically intended to look at the “Optimize Operations” portion 
of SMF with the assumption that mobile applications and infrastructure can be developed 
and appropriately secured. 
E. SOCIOTECHNICAL SYSTEMS THEORY 
In order to analyze the impact on the DOD and USMC workplace, the intersection 
of the workforce and the technology must be examined. One recognized method of 
conducting this analysis is to use the sociotechnical systems (STS) perspective, which 
enables analysis of the organization (in this case the DOD, USMC, smaller unit, etc.) 
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from a social and a technical standpoint (Bostrom & Heinen, 1977). STS theory starts 
with a premise that “Work organizations exist to do work” and that work involves people 
(inherently social creatures) and technology (computers, machines, tools, etc.) to 
complete the specified “work” (Trist, 1981, p. 10). STS theory recognizes that 
technological innovations are unlikely to be successfully integrated into an organization 
unless the organization changes and adapts to the new technology (Bostrom & Heinen, 
1977, p. 17). Therefore, the worker and the technology cannot be examined separately, 
but must instead be analyzed at the intersection between the two in order to optimize their 
interaction. 
 
Figure 5.  Sociotechnical Systems Theory. Adapted from Bostrom 
and Heinen, (1977, p. 17). 
STS theory can also lead to an understanding of why the DOD CIO and 
leadership within the DOD desires to look into implementing policies that will allow 
CMD in the DOD workplace. In Geels (2004, p. 911), the researcher determined that as 
availability of a technology increased, and as workers saw their peers in other agencies 
and organizations using the technology, a greater desire for a similar capability in their 
own organization was present. Additionally, the more highly proliferated the technology 
was, the better the understanding of and familiarity with that technology within the 
workforce, and the more that technology was improved upon (Geels, 2004, p. 911). 
Looking at a newly introduced technical innovation in the workplace from a 
social standpoint, it can be determined that the organization will be made up of at least 
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some people that do not want the new technology implemented and will either be overtly 
or covertly resistant to the implementation. These individuals are usually in positions 
within the organization that will realize some loss of status, budget, authority, etc., due to 
the change. Trist (1981, p. 46) recognized that in these situations, the optimization of STS 
must address this perceived or actual loss by these individuals with “sharing of power” in 
order to minimize their resistance. This research will use STS theory in order to analyze 
the CMD implementation case studies to determine the potential benefits and issues that 
are likely to arise from both a social and technical standpoint. 
F. TECHNOLOGY ACCEPTANCE MODEL 
In addition to looking at the optimization between the social and technical aspects 
of the organization, this research will look at how human behavior and individual 
perception can impact the successful implementation of a CMD policy in the USMC. To 
conduct this analysis, the Technology Acceptance Model will be used, which attempts to 
look at how external factors affect internal beliefs and attitudes thereby determining an 
individual’s intentions with regard to adopting a technology (Davis, Bagozzi, & 
Warshaw, 1989, p. 985). The two key factors that will be analyzed in this research are the 
“Perceived Usefulness” and the “Perceived Ease of Use,” and how those two factors will 
affect user acceptance of a CMD usage policy in the individual case studies. 
The extent to which an employee believes a particular technology will aid in the 
performance of their duties is referred to as “Perceived Usefulness,” and this factor has 
direct influence on how willing that employee is to adopting and using that technology 
(Davis, 1989, p. 320). In addition to this factor, is that of “Perceived Ease of Use” which 
refers to the employee’s perception of how difficult the technology will be to learn to 
operate and integrate into their performance of duties (Davis, 1989, p. 320). 
 24
 
Figure 6.  Technology Acceptance Model. Source: Davis et al. (1989, p. 985). 
This figure displays that “Perceived Ease of Use” is compared by the individual to 
“Perceived Usefulness” and an internal “Cost Benefit Analysis” is conducted to 
determine the “Attitude Toward Using” that technology. This internal analysis by the 
individual all leads to the individual determining their “Behavioral Intention to Use” and 
that leads to “Actual System Use” by the individual of that technology. The intent of the 
Technology Acceptance Model is to look at all of these factors in order to make a 
reasonable estimate of how technology will be accepted or rejected by the users within an 
organization (Davis et al., 1989, p. 985). The research conducted by Davis et al. (1989, 
p. 997) determined that the most influential factor is “Perceived Usefulness” in predicting 
the individual’s intention to use a particular technology. 
With this insight, the case studies developed in this research, and the policy 
implementation recommendations made will focus on the maximizing this factor as well 
as attempting to minimize the perceived difficulty of use in the eyes of the individual that 
is the target “end user” for each case. This research will look at both of these key factors 
from the perspective of the “end user” in the case studies as well as the perspective of the 
IT professionals at the unit and higher headquarters levels. 
G. CONFIDENTIALITY, INTEGRITY, AND AVAILABILITY (CIA) TRIAD 
The Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002, established 
the baseline definition of information security as “protecting information and information 
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systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or 
destruction.” From this definition, FISMA (2002) lays out the three tenets of information 
security, confidentiality, integrity, and availability, which are commonly referred to as 
the CIA Triad, displayed in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7.  Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (CIA) Triad. 
Adapted from (FISMA, 2002). 
FISMA defines the three tenets of the CIA Triad as follows: 
Tenet 1: Integrity, which means guarding against improper information 
modification or destruction, and includes ensuring information 
nonrepudiation and authenticity. (FISMA, 2002) 
Tenet 2: Confidentiality, which means preserving authorized restrictions 
on access and disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy 
and proprietary information. (FISMA, 2002) 
Tenet 3: Availability, which means ensuring timely and reliable access to 
and use of information. (FISMA, 2002) 
These definitions provide the baseline for how information security will be 
analyzed with regard to the case studies developed in this research. The FISMA 
definition for information security and the sub tenets are fairly generic. Malcom Harkins, 
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Chief Information Security Officer of Intel Corporation in 2010, discussed the topic 
further in his six irrefutable and unwritten laws of information security as follows: 
Users want to click; when connected to the Internet, people will click on 
things. Information wants to be free; people are prone to talk, post, and 
share. Code wants to be wrong; a software program can never be 100 per 
cent error-free. Services want to be on tap; some background processes 
will always have to be switched on. Security features are double-edged; 
they help and they also harm. People set and forget; the efficacy of a 
control deteriorates with time. In such a context, compromise is inevitable 
for CIO’s. (Chandrasekhar, 2013, p. 2) 
With the FISMA definitions and these “unwritten laws” a basis for analysis and 
evaluation of past, present and future IT policy implementations with regard to 
information security is present. The individual case studies in this research will look at 
specific CIA Triad issues and solutions regarding specific implementations of CMD on a 
government network. The following sub-paragraphs will serve as a brief discussion of the 
research on general CIA Triad issues of CMD implementation and the solutions that 
address those issues. 
1. General Issues 
In a DOD CIO Memorandum (2006), the issue of the security of unclassified 
sensitive DOD data on portable computing devices is recognized as a potential hazard to 
confidentiality. CMD are commercially available devices that are designed for mobility, 
which makes them vulnerable to theft or loss. In a DOD CMD implementation, the 
device is likely to connect to multiple wireless access-points, including those access-
points that are not controlled and maintained by DOD IT professionals. These access-
points could potentially provide opportunities for malicious actors to gain remote access 
to a CMD and then, in certain implementations, gain access to government networks and 
data. The employees that own and operate the CMD can be targeted for phishing, spam, 
whaling, downloading malware, and even intentionally disclosing sensitive government 
information. Employees have done these things on government networks using 
government equipment, and it can reasonably be expected that similar incidents are likely 
to occur if CMDs are given access to government networks. These issues are the same as 
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those experienced in the commercial sector in implementing CMD access policies. Using 
some commercially available technology solutions as well as well-developed user 
agreements and holding individuals accountable for their behavior has allowed 
government organizations and commercial organizations to realize the benefits of CMDs 
in the workplace while mitigating many of the risks. The key point that needs to be 
considered is that the risks cannot be eliminated and the solutions described in this 
research are capable only of managing and mitigating risk to an acceptable level. 
2. General Solutions 
The key to solving the CIA Triad issues of implementing CMD in the DOD is to 
look at the social and technical issues in order to develop an overall strategy that 
mitigates the risk of each. The technical solutions are numerous and vary based on the 
confidentiality required by law, and the level of integrity and availability that is required 
to achieve success. 
One of the most common ways of addressing issues with CMD on an enterprise 
network is the use of virtualization technology to mitigate and compartmentalize risk to 
the enterprise. In Jaramillo, Katz, Bodin, Tworek, Smart, and Cook (2013) the 
researchers looked at developing separation between the user and the enterprise in order 
to provide protection to both. Their research looked at specific software applications that 
could be used to provide this protection, as well as what software and hardware 
combinations worked best to provide security to both user and enterprise. Virtualization 
technology has the ability to allow the workforce to remotely access a virtual desktop on 
the enterprise network and to carry out their duties from any location. Additionally, 
virtualization has the ability to prevent some of the ability for DOD data to be stored on a 
personal CMD. The Jaramillo et al. (2013) research is important in looking at how the 
DOD could appropriately compartmentalize access to its networks in order to more 
securely allow limited CMD access. In Lennon (2012), the researcher studied the 
implementation of BYOD at the Letterkenny Institute of Technology in Ireland. In this 
research, the author described how Cloud Computing was used with BYOD to create a 
Virtual Learning Environment. This research is important as a means to understanding 
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what technology is available to improve training and education systems availability to the 
workforce, which will be addressed in a follow-on case study of this research. 
Another technology that has been used to maintain information security in an 
environment in which CMDs are able to access the organization network is trusted 
platform module (TPM). Under this system, the integrity of the device attempting to 
access the network is assessed and devices that do not conform to the established 
standards in terms of software installed and system settings applied are denied access to 
the network (Costantino, Martinelli, Saracino, & Sgandurra, 2013). Costantino et al. 
(2013) described the use of role-based access control systems in providing security. Their 
research looked at restricting system access based on the user, and administrator set 
permissions. Establishing the restrictions on the user will be essential in order to provide 
the needed security for the Marine Corps in any implementation of using personally 
procured mobile and computing devices. In Armando, Costa, and Merlo (2013), the 
specific issue of securely implementing BYOD with an Android device was addressed. 
Their research was limited to Android devices, which while popular in the DOD, do not 
represent the majority of devices that DOD personnel to desire to connect to the network 
as shown by Mercado and Spain (2014). TPM along with other technology will likely be 
needed in order to appropriately secure access from CMD accessing a DOD network. 
The DOD currently uses the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) technology in order 
to authenticate users on government furnished IT systems. The Common Access Card 
(CAC) is a device that allows the workforce to access PKI enabled systems, websites, etc. 
The DOD CIO Memorandum (2006) described the use of PKI in order to secure the 
“Data at Rest” on personal CMD. 
Application based access is another way that the commercial sector uses to 
compartmentalize IT systems from the threats CMD access presents to their networks. 
Intel Corp. determined that apps that made the appropriate data available to the users that 
needed that data achieved the greatest success for their company (Chandrasekhar, 2013, 
p. 4). For certain situations within the DOD, application-based access is likely all that is 
needed in order to allow secure access to a DOD network. In these cases, only the  
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information that is needed or allowed to be accessed is displayed in the application 
interface. The user has limited, if any, ability to make changes to the organization’s data, 
and permissions can be tightly controlled when combined with other technological 
means. The case studies developed in this research will look at the potential for 
application-based access to optimize operations, while mitigating risk to the network. 
Behavioral changes are necessary for the successful implementation of the use of 
CMD. In Barkhuus (2005), behavioral issues were observed when implementing BYOD 
for education. Primarily this research focused on the issue of student attention when using 
BYOD in an actual classroom. This research will be applied to developing the 
implementation plan for the proposed case studies. Additionally, Intel Corporation’s IT 
professionals raised the concern that productivity would be negatively impacted due to 
employees making the personal decision to use their devices for non-work-related 
activities and accessing the applications on the device that provide no value added to the 
company during work hours (Chandrasekhar, 2013, p. 2). This is a social issue that will 
need to be addressed through training, and supervision by the DOD and the USMC in 
order to mitigate the risk that the worker presents to the network. 
During its implementation of CMD policies, Intel’s research determined that only 
30% of its employees were accepting of the company accessing the information on their 
personal devices; however, employees were almost unanimously in favor of Intel 
managing security of their CMDs while also completing necessary training 
(Chandrasekhar, 2013, p. 3). Essentially, the IT professionals tasked with spearheading 
any CMD implementation plan will need to be aware of the inherent social/behavioral 
issues. Appropriate supervision and training, in addition to technological safeguards, will 
help to limit the CIA Triad issues of implementing a CMD policy. 
H. PREVIOUS CASE STUDIES AND RESEARCH ON CMD 
IMPLEMENTATION POLICY 
The issues of CMD implementation have not stopped or stalled the movement in 
the commercial sector, education, and even some government organizations. Each of 
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these examples shows how using various technology and behavior policies have been 
successful in increasing the mobility of their end-users. 
1. CMD in Commercial Sector (Intel Corporation) 
In 2010, Intel Corporation had nearly 80,000 employees worldwide, and nearly 
10,000 of them were already using their personal CMDs to work. The Chief Information 
Security Officer, Malcom Harkins, was faced with the challenges of determining how to 
gain a competitive advantage from employees using these devices, how to ensure the 
security of corporate data, and how to deal with the ownership of Intel Corp. data present 
on privately owned devices (Chandrasekhar, 2013, p. 1). The DOD is wrestling with 
many of these same issues as Intel Corp. in terms of how CMDs may be used to improve 
efficiency, and reduce operating costs while also addressing the potential security issues. 
Another issue Intel discovered was personal data stored on a personal CMD used 
at work and the legal issues in the event of loss, theft, or device security compromise. 
Intel recognized the legal issue regarding data encryption or implementing a remote-wipe 
capability on an employee’s CMD (Chandrasekhar, 2013, p. 7). Remotely wiping an 
employee’s device would ensure that sensitive company information was safe from 
exposure; however, this would also ensure that the employees’ personal data on that 
device was removed. This Intel Corp. case study will be used in this research to display 
the struggles that are likely to occur in implementing a CMD access policy in the DOD 
and USMC. 
2. CMD in Government 
Implementing CMD access to government networks is not a new idea, but it has 
yet to be attempted on a large scale in the DOD. Several government organizations have 
developed policies for and allowed access to their networks to worker-owned CMDs. 
a. Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB) 
In order to reduce costs in terms of acquisition and maintenance of workforce 
computing capability the TTB has embraced the use of Virtual Desktop Infrastructure 
(VDI) in order to allow CMD usage (White House, 2012). The TTB recognized that its 
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workforce was highly dispersed, with over 80% teleworking, at a nearly $2 million cost 
to regularly replace and update their employees’ desktop and laptop IT devices (three- to 
four-year replacement cycle). TTB’s implementation of VDI saved the organization 
nearly $1.2 million in these infrastructure costs, while also increasing the mobility of its 
workforce. As a result of its implementation policy, the TTB has seen the program 
expand to a point where 70% of its personnel are using CMD to conduct their daily 
duties. The main lessons learned from the TTB implementation are that VDI helps to 
mitigate the financial risks associated with the rapid pace of technological change in 
CMDs, as well as insulates the organization by not allowing organizational data to reside 
on the personal device (White House, 2012). 
b. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
Similar to the TTB, the EEOC was under budgetary constraints that necessitated a 
shift in their IT policy. Their implementation policy focused on the use of third-party 
software, in the form of mobile device management (MDM) software, which allowed the 
EEOC to enforce security settings and remotely wipe the devices in the event of theft or 
loss. This policy allowed their employees to bring their personal CMD and access the 
organization network as long as the user was in compliance with an acceptable use policy 
and the device was in compliance with the MDM. 
The EEOC was able to cut its infrastructure costs and increase the mobility of its 
workforce through the implementation of a CMD access policy. The main lesson learned 
from the EEOC implementation were that legal counsel should be consulted early and 
often to protect the organization and ensure the legality of any user policy developed 
(White House, 2012). This will be important for any DOD or USMC implementation 
policy, as the DOD is subject to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, and other 
government records audit laws. 
c. State of Delaware 
In dealing with an aging portfolio of BlackBerry devices, the State of Delaware 
made the transition from organization furnished devices to a BYOD program for certain 
employees. Delaware recognized that “many employees carry personal devices in 
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addition to the state issued device” and that employee efficiency and cost savings could 
be realized through allowing employees to use their personal device for work. 
The key challenges that Delaware faced included legal questions about taxability 
of the employee reimbursements (for wireless costs) as well as the FOIA request issues, 
similar to the TTB and EEOC cases. These issues were ultimately addressed to a 
satisfactory level, and the State of Delaware was able to reduce expenses related to 
devices by 45%. Delaware limited the reimbursement program to employees who are 
“out of the office on business 50 or more annual days,” whose “duties require them to be 
contacted anywhere/anytime,” and who have “24/7 response requirements” (White 
House, 2012). The employees in this program have similar job duty requirements to 
many DOD employees, and therefore may be a good target group for the DOD in a CMD 
implementation pilot program. 
The State of Delaware case is particularly applicable to this research because the 
DOD and, more specifically, the USMC are currently looking at how to deal with the 
costs of an aging BlackBerry device portfolio. It is important to note that the State of 
Delaware made the BYOD policy open to all employees, but only reimbursed expenses to 
the employees who met the previously stated requirements. 
3. Previous Research on CMD in DOD 
Similar to the issues faced by the previously described government agencies, the 
USMC and the DOD in larger part will need to determine how best to deal with 
ownership of devices, reimbursement, FOIA requests, remote device wiping, and 
employee behavior. In the research done by Wedel and Michalowicz (2015), the 
researchers looked at some of the legal, technical, and security issues with BYOD in 
terms of developing a user policy that could be used by the Marine Corps. Their research 
was primarily focused policy issues, and looked at three implementations of BYOD in 
government and commercial business organizations. It was their determination that a 
carefully crafted user agreement could protect the organization and the individual while 
realizing the benefits of BYOD for the workforce (Wedel & Michalowicz, 2015, p. 91). 
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The issue of policy and policy development for incorporating secure smartphone 
technology in the USMC was researched by Epstein (2014). Epstein (2014, p. 76) was 
able to determine that significant benefits in terms of efficiency and effectiveness were 
possible through the use of a hypothetical secure smartphone in a tactical situation for the 
USMC. However, through analyzing current policy in the DOD, Epstein (2014, p. 76) 
determined that current policies are unable to list the vulnerabilities associated with the 
numerous hardware/software configurations. This results in a potentially unacceptable 
level of risk with regard to implementing these devices, based on the current technology 
and policies. In Adkison (2015), the topic of mobile application development for use on 
CMDs in a tactical USMC unit was looked at. Adkison (2015) looked at the utility of 
enterprise mobile applications for aviation, healthcare, document management, as well as 
more military specific applications for fires, reporting, and information sharing. The 
determination was that the USMC could benefit from the use of mobile applications, and 
that additional research was needed in terms of the security and connectivity of mobile 
devices in a tactical environment (Adkison, 2015, p. 72). The issue of smartphones in 
tactical situations is beyond the scope of this research. 
The gap in the previous research is that implementing a CMD access policy is an 
information strategy, as described in The Information Systems Strategy Triangle 
framework developed by Pearson and Saunders (2013, p. 24). The research tends to focus 
on this one portion of the triangle; it does not look into how this information strategy will 
affect or be affected by the business and organizational strategies. The previous research 
seems to be based on the notion that the implementation of a CMD access policy in the 
Marine Corps is inevitable, and the business and organizational issues will need to adapt. 
I. SUMMARY 
The focus of this research is on better understanding the implications of using 
CMDs in the DOD in order to allow senior leaders within the DOD to better determine if 
these policies should be pursued, rather than viewing the change as inevitable. The 
business strategy, organizational strategy and the informational strategy of the Marine 
Corps will be analyzed in specific case studies to understand their alignment or disparity. 
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Using sociotechnical systems (STS) theory and the technology acceptance model (TAM) 
this research will look at these cases to understand the potential issues of implementing a 




This research is a series of three qualitative case studies on the implications of 
creating a new information technology strategy within the United States Marine Corps 
(USMC) that allows the use of Commercial Mobile Devices (CMD) by the workforce to 
connect to and interact with organizational data systems. The case studies developed in 
this research are intended to address specific circumstances that would benefit the USMC 
in terms of efficiency and effectiveness of the workforce, while also providing potential 
opportunities for cost savings in infrastructure. Due to established information 
technology security policies, infrastructure limitations, and the current state of mobile 
device technology, it is not possible to study these cases directly. Consequently, in order 
to conduct this research, hypothetical case study methodology will be used. 
The fundamental purpose of this research is to create a better understanding of the 
potential issues and benefits the Marine Corps could reasonably expect if a conceptual 
policy allowing the use of CMDs in the workplace was enacted. Therefore, the cases 
developed for this research are conceptual in nature and address specific instances of the 
conceptual policy and the implications at the individual, unit, and organizational levels. 
A. RESEARCHER BIAS 
The researcher is biased toward technology solutions that decrease redundancy 
(duplicating work in multiple systems), while simultaneously increasing information 
availability to those individuals that need it. Additionally, the researcher is biased against 
solutions that place additional workload on the end-users of the technology, preferring 
that burden to be on supporting elements (contractors, etc.). This bias comes from the 
researcher’s experiences and the perception that technology solutions have been 
implemented that seemed to only increase redundancy and increase the workload of the 
end-user. 
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B. CMD IN MARINE CORPS EDUCATION AND TRAINING CASE STUDY 
(CASE 1) 
Time to conduct training is one of the many resource limitations facing the 
USMC that leaders are required to contend with in order to prepare their units for 
deployment. The premise of this case study is that CMD technology has an ability to 
increase availability of education and training resources to the individual Marine. By 
increasing availability of education and training resources, this technology has the 
potential to allow leaders to more effectively and efficiently use this limited resource of 
time. If appropriately implemented and integrated with Marine Corps culture and training 
processes, this technology could positively impact overall training and readiness of the 
force. 
The total number of active duty personnel in the United States Marine Corps 
varies slightly from month to month; however, the current end-strength goal is 182,000 
(Marine Corps Concepts and Programs—End Strength, 2015, Description section, para 
1). In order to maintain the total end-strength, Marine Corps Recruiting Command 
(MCRC) must recruit talented candidates (both enlisted and officer) to counter the 
outflow of personnel due to retirements, resignations, or completing their contractual 
obligation and returning to a civilian or reserve status. The Marine Corps Recruit Depots 
(MCRD) in San Diego and Parris Island, produce nearly 21,000 and 18,000 new Marines 
a year, respectively (Marines Operating Forces Presence Detail MCRD Parris Island & 
MCRD San Diego, n.d.). These new Marines generally serve a four-year contract, with 
roughly 23% of these first term Marines receiving an opportunity to re-enlist for a second 
term (Motley & Bird, 2016). The result of the high accession of new recruits and low 
retention opportunities are a high throughput of Marines every year. 
1. Background and Organization 
Training and education in the Marine Corps is overseen by Training and 
Education Command (TECOM), headquartered in Quantico, VA. TECOM’s mission is 
as follows: 
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TECOM is charged by the Commandant of the Marine Corps with the 
development, coordination, resourcing, execution, and evaluation of 
training and education concepts, policies, plans, and programs to ensure 
Marines are prepared to meet the challenges of present and future 
operational environments. (Training and Education Command, n.d., 
Mission section) 
TECOM is further divided into two separate commands, Training Command and 
Education Command (also referred to as the Marine Corps University [MCU]). Training 
Command conducts Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) “individual-skill training, 
analyzes, designs, develops, resources, implements, and evaluates standards-based 
individual training in order to provide combat-capable Marines and Sailors to the 
operating forces” (Training Command, n.d., para. 1). MCU’s mission is “to develop, 
deliver, and evaluate professional military education and training through resident and 
nonresident programs to prepare leaders to meet the challenges of the national security 
environment” (Marine Corps University Vision Statement, n.d., MCU Mission Statement 
section). 
Within MCU is the College of Distance Education and Training (CDET) whose 
mission is to “design, develop, deliver, evaluate, manage, and resource distance learning 
products and programs across the Marine Corps training and education continuum in 
order to increase operational readiness” (United States Marine Corps College of Distance 
Education and Training, n.d.). CDET works with a network of regional centers (based on 
Marine Corps bases) to provide Professional Military Education (PME) to Marines on 
these bases. Additionally, CDET maintains the online repository of computer-based 
training for the Marine Corps, Marine Corps Distance Learning Network (MarineNet). 
All Marines are required to complete mandatory annual training through 
MarineNet, which is an online system that provides access to computer based training 
modules. Fifteen courses are required to be completed by every Marine annually with 
topics ranging from Cyber Awareness, Operational Security, Anti-terrorism Awareness, 
to personal health and wellness training (MarineNet Annual Training Curriculums in 
Support of MCBul 1500, 2013). In addition to these annual training requirements, 
MarineNet offers courses (both mandatory and optional) that provide Military 
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Occupational Specialty (MOS) specific initial and follow-on training, as well as 
Professional Military Education (PME) courses that are required for advancement at 
various stages of a Marines career. In total, MarineNet offers over 4,500 computer-based 
training modules and numerous training resources that are available 24/7 to Marines 
provided they have access to a compatible computer system (MarineNet Tips, Tools & 
Practices, 2011). 
According to the MarineNet Software Baseline Requirements (n.d.), “To ensure 
correct operation of audio, video, and interactive courseware components, you need 
specific computer hardware and software.” This resource goes on to list a number of 
Windows operating systems and applications that are required to complete the computer-
based training modules. These baseline requirements do not mention compatibility with 
the current Windows operating system (Windows 10) or the previous operating system 
(Windows 8). Additionally, the requirements list only one web browser as compatible, 
Internet Explorer. This requirements list does not provide any information regarding 
compatibility with CMDs. 
The Marine Corps has approximately 184,000 Active Duty Marines who require 
regular access to computer-based training, and approximately 39,000 Reserve Marines 
who require periodic access (Title IV—Military Personnel Authorizations, 2015). 
Increasing accessibility to this training has the potential to positively affect Marine Corps 
training and readiness. Additionally, increasing accessibility through devices that users 
already own and operate has the potential to reduce the infrastructure costs (in terms of 
desktop and laptop computers) of the Marine Corps. The focus of this case is on how 
allowing CMDs to access Marine Corps training and education resources could 
potentially provide benefits within an Infantry unit in a garrison training environment. 
2. Researcher Experience 
The researcher has previously served in the Regimental Operations Department of 
3d Marine Regiment, stationed at Marine Corps Base Hawaii (MCBH) Kaneohe Bay, 
Hawaii. The researcher was assigned as the Assistant Regimental Air Officer. Due to 
manpower shortages, the researcher’s duties exceeded the bounds of an Air Officer, 
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which normally include training Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTAC) and serving as 
the Regimental Commanding Officers principal advisor on all matters involving the 
tactical employment of aircraft. The researcher also was involved in developing, 
scheduling, coordinating, and observing subordinate unit infantry tactics training to 
include field exercises, weapons training, as well as annual required training. The 
researcher has observed infantry units training for and deploying to combat operations as 
well as joint and multi-national exercises. 
3. Case Explanation 
The observation of the researcher is that Marine Corps infantry units train to a 
diverse set of missions and then deploy to accomplish some, all, or none of the missions 
for which they specifically trained. The Infantry Training & Readiness Manual 
(Department of the Navy: Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 2013) lists hundreds 
of training events, along with the performance standards, that infantry units are expected 
to complete in order to meet the demands of deployment. These training events range 
from individual skills, to squad/platoon/company/battalion level live-fire events. 
This manual does not include additional training requirements such as annual 
marksmanship qualification training (generally two dedicated weeks of training), water-
survival qualification, daily physical training, PME, the Marine Corps Martial Arts 
Program (MCMAP), Chemical Biological Radiological & Nuclear (CBRN) training, and 
annual administrative training. Additionally, the researcher has observed additional 
training mandated on these units from higher echelons of command that was in reaction 
to some incident or mandate outside of the Marine Corps (i.e., Marine is involved in an 
incident with local Police and an “All Hands” training is mandated, or Congressional 
leadership mandates training due to an increase in reported sexual assaults). 
Wong (2002, p. 7) conducted a study in the U.S. Army to determine the time 
available to train for an infantry company in comparison to the training required to be 
conducted in a given year. In any given year, 109 of the 365 days are unavailable for 
training due weekends or federal holidays, resulting in only 256 available training days 
(Wong, 2002, p. 7). Examining the required training events and the time required to 
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complete each of these events, Wong (2002, p. 7) determined that approximately 
297 days of training were required. Of these 297 days, it was determined that 254 days of 
training were dedicated to mission-related training (infantry skills training, etc.), while 
the other 43 days were dedicated to non-mission-related training (Wong, 2002, p. 7). This 
study only looked at Army units; however, the training requirements between the Army 
and Marine Corps are potentially similar in terms of the time to complete and the ratio of 
mission-related to non-mission-related training events. Additionally, the researcher 
observed instances where a Marine Corps infantry unit conducted its training on 
weekends or holidays. Every effort was made to avoid this, however, and to provide 
compensatory time during the work week to the affected personnel when possible. All of 
these education and training requirements, coupled with looming deadlines to prepare the 
Marines and their families for the rigors of deployment, add to the need for creative and 
innovative solutions in time management. 
It is important to recognize that while the unit itself may have more training 
requirements than it has training days to complete them, a particular individual 
(especially the more junior Marines) is not likely to be actively engaged in training 
during the entire time the unit is conducting a particular training event. This allows the 
opportunity for potential white-space (free time, or time not actively engaged in an event) 
that could be used by a Marine to access MarineNet and complete PME, MOS training, 
language training, or other annual training requirements. 
One particular example of this white-space opportunity is annual marksmanship 
training. The researcher has observed this training first hand numerous times. During this 
training, windows of time are present that a Marine has completed a live-fire event and is 
waiting for the remaining Marines to finish to move on to another stage of the training. 
This time can range from 15 minutes to an hour or more depending on the number of 
Marines training. The researcher observed that this time is generally spent by Marines 
conducting their “Smoke break” or socializing with their friends. This research is not 
advocating that Marines not be allowed their “Smoke-break” or socialization time, only 
that in an already crowded training schedule this time could potentially be used for the 
completion of training. 
 41
The researcher observed that a majority of these Marines own a CMD, usually a 
smartphone or tablet, which is with them in their backpack during this marksmanship 
training. These devices are not allowed on the firing line, and the researcher has observed 
them being confiscated by range personnel due to their unauthorized use. This research is 
not advocating that Marines who are engaged in conducting other training themselves, or 
are aiding other Marines in their training, be distracted from their task by using CMDs for 
professional purposes. Supervision, both by range personnel and the training units Staff 
Non-Commissioned Officers (SNCOs) and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) is 
critical in order to ensure safety and quality training. 
Another example of white-space in an infantry units’ schedule is helicopter 
operations training. In this training, a helicopter squadron is tasked with providing a static 
aircraft for Marines to practice entering and exiting in a tactical manner. Additionally, the 
squadron provides a section (two aircraft) to fly in and out of a landing zone allowing the 
Marines to enter the aircraft, fly a pre-determined flight path, and either land in the same 
zone or a different zone and exit the aircraft. During this training, each helicopter is able 
to accommodate one squad or less per flight. According to Marine Corps Reference 
Publication (MCRP) 1–10.1 (2016), a Marine Infantry Rifle Company generally has 9 
squads, with the potential for additional attachment squads as desired by the Battalion 
Commander. 
The researcher has observed this training event, by a company-sized infantry 
element, takes anywhere from 3–6 hours to complete. During this period, an individual 
squad may go an hour or more without an aircraft to train with. This waiting period is 
extended in the event that one or more of the aircraft have mechanical or weather-related 
issues prior to or during the scheduled training time. 
These situations are only two examples of periods of time that could be used for 
training and education of Marines. The issue is access to the resources, more specifically 
access to MarineNet. Looking at the current state of technology, several alternative 
solutions exist. 
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4. Potential Courses of Action 
These solutions are limited to the specifics of this particular case, but the courses 
of action (COA) have the potential to be expanded for use by other units in the Marine 
Corps. These COAs will be discussed in terms of the potential CMD implementation 
strategy categories, and Confidentiality, Integrity, & Availability (CIA) Triad 
considerations. 
a. HYOD with App-Based Access (Case 1, COA 1) 
This COA recognizes that the Marine Corps may want to ensure 100% of Marines 
have access to the newly developed application. The Marine Corps does not currently 
mandate ownership of a CMD by Marines, and of those Marines that do own a CMD, the 
Marine Corps does not force the usage of a particular operating system on a personally 
owned CMD. A HYOD implementation strategy would allow the Marine Corps to select 
a single device (or group of similar devices) with only one common operating system and 
then control those devices in terms of configuration and usage. In this case, the Marine 
Corps is responsible for purchasing the devices, managing the devices, providing wireless 
access (possibly even cellular access), and developing and maintaining the application. 
The individual Marine is responsible for learning to operate the device, maintain 
accountability of the device, use the device in accordance with appropriate usage 
guidelines, and return the device to Information Technology (IT) staff when requested. 
b. CYOD with App-Based Access (Case 1, COA 2) 
The Marine Corps could potentially use a CYOD implementation strategy, which 
is a slight modification of the HYOD implementation strategy. In this COA, the Marine 
Corps could capitalize on the individual user familiarity in a particular operating system 
by offering a choice between (for an example) an iOS device or an Android device. The 
responsibilities of the Marine Corps and the individual are the same as Case 1, COA 1. 
c. BYOD with App-Based Access (Case 1, COA 3) 
This research assumes that the majority of Marines have a personally owned 
CMD, which is based on the Mercado and Spain (2014, p. 7) research that showed that 
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over 79% of Soldiers in the Army owned “at least one mobile device.” With this 
assumption, it is suggested that the Marine Corps develop a MarineNet application and 
make it available for download on personally owned CMD. This application would need 
to be compatible with at least the two most popular mobile operating systems (Android, 
and iOS), which would allow access to 70% or more of personally owned devices 
(Mercado, & Spain, 2014, p. 9). 
This MarineNet application would need the ability to authenticate the user using 
at least two factors. It is suggested that a username and a password be used to 
authenticate each time the user accesses the application. It is also suggested that some 
process is established that allows the Marine to download the application initially, and 
having a confirmation email sent to their official email (@usmc.mil) account. This email 
would allow the Marine to authorize the CMDs media access control (MAC) address. 
This could help to prevent unauthorized users from access the application, helping to 
enforce confidentiality of the courseware. 
In terms of availability, this research recognized that some of these training events 
occur in remote field-environment areas, and therefore wireless connectivity may not be 
available. For the purposes of this case study, the assumption is made that the zone is in a 
location that has cellular connectivity, which would allow the Marines waiting to conduct 
training the opportunity to connect to MarineNet and access the multitude of computer-
based training modules available. The requirement for wireless connectivity could 
potentially be overcome, if subsequent application updates allowed Marines the ability to 
download courses from MarineNet on their CMD. This would also require the ability for 
the application to update the Marines’ training records the next time the application is 
able to connect to the Internet. 
This COA allows the Marines to bring their personally owned (user preferred) 
devices and connect to the application, allowing access to training and education 
resources. This research recognizes that not all Marines own a CMD, and of those who 
do own a CMD, not all of them will be willing or able to use the application. 
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5. Case Summary 
This case looked specifically at maximizing the availability of MarineNet training 
and education courseware to Marines during periods of down-time in their regular 
garrison training environment. The use of CMDs in conjunction with application based 
access could provide more efficient and timely completion of computer-based training by 
Marines. While this case looked only at an infantry unit in the Marine Corps, it is 
possible that other units (in the Marine Corps, and other services) could potentially 
benefit from the selection of any of the previously descried COAs. The potential 
efficiency of application based access on a CMD are not limited to training and 
education. It is possible that numerous daily processes performed by Marine Corps units 
could benefit from the application of this technology. 
C. CMD IN SQUADRON FLIGHT SCHEDULE DEVELOPMENT CASE 
STUDY (CASE 2) 
Squadron flight schedule development and approval is a complex, time-
consuming process requiring collaboration by several individuals. The premise of this 
case study is that CMD technology has an ability to increase collaboration of those 
individuals involved in flight schedule development. By increasing collaboration, this 
technology has the potential to allow for a more effective and efficient flight schedule 
development by Marine Corps squadrons. If appropriately implemented and integrated 
into the culture, and flight schedule development processes this technology could 
potentially positively impact aviation mishap investigations. 
In the garrison training environment, the mission of the Marines in a USMC 
aviation squadron can be simply stated as “the safe execution of the daily flight 
schedule.” Each of the individual departments that make up the squadron (Operations, 
Maintenance, Logistics, Safety, etc.) has an impact on, and input into the development 
and execution of the daily flight schedule. The daily task of developing the flight 
schedule can be a complex, and time-consuming process. Through the use of CMD 




For the purposes of this research, the terms Naval Aviation and Marine Corps 
Aviation are considered to be synonymous. Navy aircraft and Marine Corps aircraft are 
all subject to the rules and regulations of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OpNav), Naval Air Systems Command 
(NAVAIR), and Headquarters United States Marine Corps (HQMC). Marine Corps pilots 
are responsible for understanding FAA regulations, and by following the procedures 
described in the OpNav and HQMC sources, all flights are in compliance with the FAA 
scheduling regulations. 
The Commanding Officer authorizes an aircrew to fly naval aircraft under his/her 
control through physically signing the daily flight schedule (OpNav, 2009). The signature 
of the Commanding Officer on the flight schedule marks the successful completion of a 
complex process that is usually carried out daily in a squadron. The process of 
developing the daily schedule can start months in advance of execution, when key 
stakeholders (Operations Officer, Maintenance Officer, and Commanding Officer) meet 
to develop long-term training plans. Prior to this meeting, the Operations Officer 
determines what aircrew training is needed by the squadron in order to prepare for the 
next deployment. The Maintenance Officer determines the state of the aircraft and 
attempts to forecast their availability, taking into account regularly scheduled 
maintenance periods. The Commanding Officer acts as the arbiter between the key 
stakeholders and the result of the meeting is a general schedule (usually a 30-day, 60-day, 
and 90-day plan) that both the Operations and Maintenance departments can prepare for. 
For the purposes of this research, this output will be referred to as the monthly flight 
schedule. 
The researcher has observed this monthly flight schedule development from the 
perspective of the Operations department and the Maintenance department. The monthly 
flight schedule usually shows the number of aircraft that can be scheduled for flight 
operations/training on a given day, as well as the number of hours that those aircraft can 
be flown during that day. It is from this information that the Operations Officer (OpsO) 
and the Pilot Training Officer (PTO) develop the weekly flight schedule. The weekly 
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flight schedule is used to describe the expected takeoff and landing times of the aircraft, 
the training events that will occur, and the aircrew expected to fly those aircraft. 
The weekly flight schedule is, in general, written at least one week in advance and 
must take into account many factors. The PTO must look at the training that is needed to 
prepare the aircrew of the squadron and then match those in need of training, with 
aircrew instructors that are authorized to conduct the training. This task is made more 
difficult by the individual schedules of the Marines in the squadron. The researcher has 
observed one method that PTOs use to accommodate individual needs, called the Snivel 
Log. The Snivel Log is the method by which an individual Marine can communicate to 
the PTO his/her availability to conduct aircrew training on a given day. The individual 
Marine is expected to put in periods of non-availability due to appointments, vacation, 
temporary active duty assignment, or family issues. 
With the Snivel Log, the PTO populates the weekly flight schedule, and then that 
schedule is agreed to by the key stakeholders (the Safety department is added to the key 
stakeholders at this point). This provides the Maintenance department another 
opportunity to assess the state of the squadron’s aircraft and determine if the previously 
agreed to monthly plan is still supportable. The Safety department assesses the weekly 
flight schedule to ensure it is in compliance with all OpNav and HQMC rules and 
regulations regarding aircrew selection and assignment. Finally, the Commanding Officer 
approves the weekly flight schedule and sends it back to the PTO, who directly oversees 
the squadron schedule writers. 
The researcher has observed that the monthly and weekly flight schedules are 
generally developed in a spreadsheet program (usually Microsoft Excel). The successful 
completion of the weekly flight schedule results in the schedule writers inputting the 
information into the Marine-Sierra Hotel Aviation Readiness Program (M-SHARP). M-
SHARP is an online-based training management system used for scheduling and logging 
flights (Department of the Navy: Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 2016). This 
program stores the individual qualifications (i.e., Night Vision Goggle qualified) and 
designations (i.e., Night Vision Systems Instructor) for squadron personnel. 
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The Marine Corps mandates the use of M-SHARP in order to “plan, schedule, 
log, track, and manage all training and readiness reporting requirements” (Department of 
the Navy: Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 2016, p. 2-17). M-SHARP offers 
the ability to operate connected to the Internet, as well as the ability to create a self-
contained network (not requiring Internet connection) for use during deployed operations. 
This self-contained system is required to be connected to the Internet upon return from 
deployment to update the online system (Department of the Navy DON: Headquarters 
United States Marine Corps, 2016, p. 2-20). 
The daily flight schedule is developed in M-SHARP by a qualified schedule 
writer, and then a paper copy of the schedule is printed for validation and concurrence by 
the various departments as directed by the Commanding Officer. The researcher observed 
that at a minimum the following key stakeholders validate and concur with the daily 
flight schedule prior to Commanding Officers approval: Operations Officer, Maintenance 
Officer, Aviation Safety Officer, and Executive Officer. The researcher has also observed 
that in special circumstances, the Commanding Officer signed the daily flight schedule 
without key stakeholder validation and concurrence. 
Each of these key stakeholders has the ability to make changes to the schedule 
that the schedule writer is then required to fix in M-SHARP. The schedule writer then re-
prints and re-circulates the altered flight schedule for each key stakeholder’s concurrence. 
The researcher has observed that this process of revision and re-work consumes hours of 
schedule writer time and effort. In a squadron with multiple schedule writers, the 
researcher has observed the assignment of one schedule writer to inputting the weekly 
flight schedule into M-SHARP and another to the daily routing of the next day’s flight 
schedule. In this scenario, the schedule writer begins the work-day with a schedule that 
is already prepared for routing, and then that schedule writer could take an entire eight- to 
10-hour day attempting to get the concurrence of all the key stakeholders in order to 
allow the Commanding Officer to sign the flight schedule. 
The researcher has observed many causes for the duration of this task. Some of 
these causes are due to aircraft maintenance issues, or time-critical personnel issues that 
are unlikely to be avoided. Other causes are due to nature of naval aviation training and 
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various safety policies that affect the key stakeholder’s ability to physically arrive for 
duty before a certain time. For example, if one of the key stakeholders are assigned to 
night flight training. OpNav “crew rest” regulations require that, at a minimum, aircrew 
be given 8 hours of “uninterrupted sleep time for every 24-hour period” and should not 
be “scheduled for continuous alert and/or flight duty in excess of 18 hours” (Department 
of the Navy Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 2009, p. 8-15). 
In order to comply with these regulations, the researcher has observed 
Commanding Officers to use their squadron Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) to 
enforce more stringent “crew rest” planning factors. In these planning factors, the 
researcher has observed the Commanding Officer restrict aircrew from reporting to work 
earlier than 10 hours prior to that aircrew’s expected land time. In the case of night flying 
training operations that include flying until midnight, the aircrew would not be allowed to 
report to work earlier than 1400 that day. If a member of that aircrew is a key stakeholder 
in the schedule development and approval, the schedule would wait until he/she reported 
to work for the day. This case will look at how, with additional functionality added to M-
SHARP, the Marine Corps could potentially complete this process in a timelier and more 
efficient manner. 
2. Researcher Experience 
The researcher has four years of experience in a Marine Corps CH-53D “Sea 
Stallion” squadron, stationed on Marine Corps Base Hawaii, Kaneohe Bay, HI. The 
researcher served as a squadron pilot with multiple instructor designations and 
assignments as a squadron schedule writer, assistant to the Operations Officer, Aviation 
Safety Officer (ASO), Director of Safety and Standardization (DoSS), and Assistant 
Aircraft Maintenance Officer (AAMO) with the squadron. Due to this experience, the 
researcher has been involved with the flight scheduling process from every key 
stakeholder position with the exception of the Commanding Officer. 
3. Case Explanation 
The development and eventual Commanding Officer approval of the daily flight 
schedule is a process that involves collaboration by numerous individuals. The process is 
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complex—not because it is complicated—but because numerous factors affecting it are 
constantly changing. For example, the previous day’s flying operations could leave the 
maintenance department with fewer flyable aircraft than previously agreed to. This 
situation could cause an entire schedule to be cancelled, or some reduced number of 
events flown. Additionally, aircraft readiness or weather-related cancellations of a high-
priority event could cause a ripple effect that forces changes to several subsequent flight 
schedules. In the researcher’s experience, these issues are very common, to the point of 
being routine. 
Often the consequences of making changes to the schedule due to these issues 
leads to 2nd- and 3rd-order effects that extend the time for the schedule to reach 
completion. For example, in the case of weather affecting a high-priority event, the 
researcher has observed the PTO may re-schedule the event and push the previously 
scheduled event back a day or more. This change seems benign; however, the 
consequence is the schedule is re-routed through all the key stakeholders again. During 
this process, the researcher has observed that aircrew are scheduled for events that they 
are unable to fly due to previously scheduled engagements, as detailed in the Snivel Log. 
The schedule is then returned to the PTO and the schedule writer for further re-work, and 
re-routing. This process takes time, and as each individual key stakeholder returns the 
schedule for re-work, the schedule must be re-routed to all the key stakeholders for their 
concurrence. Additionally, this time consuming and inefficient process is further delayed 
if any individual is prevented from reporting to work due to crew rest considerations. 
CMDs are, by their nature highly portable, instantly accessible and able to 
connect to the Internet (Tucker, 2010, p. 1). The connectivity and portability of CMDs 
could allow the Marine Corps to overcome issues related to crew rest. This would likely 
require the Commanding Officer to officially grant the key stakeholders an exemption (in 
the squadron Standard Operating Procedures) regarding crew rest policy allowing them to 
telecommute (under circumstances where it is warranted) during their crew rest period. 
These devices are not currently given access to the M-SHARP system. M-SHARP 
requires a common access card (CAC) and a CAC reader in order to access the system. 
Additionally, Internet Explorer 11 is the only web browser that is stated to be compatible 
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with M-SHARP, and the user manual clearly states “attempting to use other versions of 
Internet Explorer or other web browsers may result in the program not displaying or 
functioning as intended” (Marines Sierra Hotel Aviation Readiness Program: Software 
User Manual, 2016, p. xxxv). Navy Marine Corps (NAVMC) 3500.14D (2016), 
mandates the use of M-SHARP by all aviation units. In order to allow a CMD to access 
M-SHARP, this research has developed several COAs. 
4. Potential Courses of Action 
These solutions are limited to the specifics of this particular case. These COAs 
will be discussed in terms of the potential CMD implementation strategy categories, and 
CIA Triad considerations. 
This research assumes that the majority of Marines have a personally owned 
CMD, but do not have a CAC capability on their devices. In this COA, the Marine Corps 
would be required to contract the development of an application that had access to a 
limited number of functions within the M-SHARP program by either the developer of M-
SHARP or a third-party contractor. M-SHARP, in addition to the scheduling utility, has 
numerous functions that while not subject to classification requirements are likely 
sensitive information. The researcher has observed information regarding aircrew training 
and readiness levels, and personally identifiable information (PII) has been stored on the 
M-SHARP system. The application developed would only need access to specific 
information (based on the individual key stakeholder’s position) and access to the 
schedule. 
The researcher has observed that M-SHARP only allows one user (usually the 
schedule writer) to view/edit the schedule. This limits collaboration by the key 
stakeholders and would not take advantage of the connectivity, and collaborative 
capability that CMDs allow. It is suggested that the application incorporate a document 
editor function that would allow the schedule writer to share the schedule with all the key 
stakeholders for their review and edits simultaneously. The application should have the 
ability for the key stakeholders to make changes, add notes, as well as a text-based chat 
function. With an application like this, the key stakeholders would have the ability to see 
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each other’s changes in near real time, and make comments to each other and the 
schedule writer. The potential benefit of this application is that collaboration would be 
possible between the key stakeholders until a satisfactory product is produced and ready 
for the Commanding Officer’s signature. 
a. HYOD with App-Based Access (Case 2, COA 1) 
In a HYOD implementation strategy, the Marine Corps would be responsible for 
developing the application, providing a CMD to each key stakeholder, and procuring 
wireless contracts for the devices. The individual would be required to maintain physical 
security of the device, and provide it to the IT staff when requested for updates and 
configuration checks. The squadron would maintain the devices, as new people rotated in 
and out of the key stakeholder positions. The devices would likely be of one 
configuration (operating system, security functions, etc.). Additionally, the newly 
developed application would only need to allow access to the government furnished 
devices. 
b. CYOD with App-Based Access (Case 2, COA 2) 
In a CYOD implementation, the Marine Corps and the individual would have the 
same responsibilities as Case 2, COA 1. The fundamental difference would be that the 
Marine Corps would offer a choice in device to either the squadron or the key 
stakeholder. The intended benefit of CYOD over HYOD would be observed when the 
user is allowed to use a device he/she is more familiar with (Grajar et al., 2013, p. 63). 
The researcher has observed that individuals can transition in and out of these key 
stakeholder positions frequently, and it may be more timely and cost efficient to allow the 
squadron Commanding Officer or IT staff to decide on a mix of various approved devices 
that are distributed. For example, a squadron may be allotted six CMDs, and choose to 
have four running iOS, and two running Android. In this scenario, the potential exists that 
some of the key stakeholders would not be issued their preferred device. The researcher 
has observed that the majority of these key stakeholders are officers of the rank O-3 or 
O-4 (with four to 20 years of commissioned service), and would likely adapt quickly to 
the device with minimal adversity. 
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c. BYOD with App-Based Access (Case 2, COA 3) 
In a BYOD implementation, the Marine Corps could capitalize on the CMD 
already owned by the individual Marine. The researcher has observed that individuals in 
these key stakeholder positions usually owned their own CMD and were familiar with the 
operation of their device. The Marine Corps would still be responsible for developing the 
application, and could possibly provide a stipend to offset the users wireless contract 
costs. The Marine Corps would need to develop a system of granting and revoking access 
to the application as individuals were transferred in and out of the key stakeholder billets. 
5. Case Summary 
This case looked at the possibility of using CMDs to improve efficiency and 
collaboration in the development of a Marine Corps aviation squadron conducting 
training in a garrison environment. Through application-based access to M-SHARP by 
the key stakeholders working on a CMD, the case was made that the process could 
potentially be improved. This daily process is common to all Marine Corps aviation 
squadrons. The potential exists, that a similar application and CMD access could benefit 
the daily flight scheduling process of other services (Army, Navy, Air Force, & Coast 
Guard). 
D. CMD IN AVIATION MISHAP INVESTIGATION CASE STUDY (CASE 3) 
Conducting an aviation mishap investigation is a lengthy, time-consuming process 
that involves extensive collaboration by several individuals. The premise of this case 
study is that CMD technology has an ability to increase collaboration and mobility of 
those individuals involved in the investigation. By increasing collaboration and mobility, 
this technology has the potential to allow for a more effective and efficient investigative 
capability in the Navy and Marine Corps. If appropriately implemented and integrated 
into the culture, training, and investigative processes this technology could potentially 
positively impact aviation mishap investigations. 
In a USMC aviation squadron, aviation mishaps can and do occur at any time of 
the day or night and require immediate investigation by a several appointed experts in 
 53
order to determine the cause of the incident. Each of the individual departments that 
make up the squadron (Operations, Maintenance, Safety, etc.) has either a direct or an 
indirect role in completing the investigation. Aviation mishap investigations are a 
complex and, in some cases, a time-consuming process for numerous individuals. The 
use of CMD technology by the Marines involved in the early and on-going stages of the 
investigation could have significant impact on the ability to conduct a thorough 
investigation in a timely and efficient manner. 
1. Background 
The stated purpose of both a Navy and a Marine Corps aviation squadron’s 
aviation safety program is to “preserve human lives and material resources, thereby, to 
enhance readiness” (Department of the Navy Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 
2014). Aviation mishap investigations are intended to determine “the hazard(s) which 
precipitated the mishap and to recommend remedies to prevent recurrence” (Senior 
Member Guide, 2010). In the event of an aviation mishap, including a naval aircraft of 
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), the squadron will execute the Pre-Mishap Plan as 
developed by the Aviation Safety Officer and in accordance with Office of the Chief of 
Naval Operations Instruction (OPNAVINST) 3750.6S (Naval Aviation Safety 
Management System). 
For purposes of this research, a naval aviation mishap is defined as: 
an unplanned event or series of events, directly involving a defined naval 
aircraft or UAV, that results in damage to DOD property; occupational 
illness to DOD personnel; injury to on or off-duty DOD military 
personnel; injury to on-duty DOD civilian personnel; or damage to public 
or private property, or injury or illness to non-DOD personnel, caused by 
DOD activities. (OpNav, 2014, p. 3-5) 
Naval aviation mishaps are classified based on the severity of material damage 




Table 2.   Naval Aviation Mishap Severity Classifications.  
Adapted from OpNav (2014, pp. 3-14 – 3-15). 
 
 
Naval aviation mishaps are further classified into subcategories relating to the 
state of the aircraft and the aircrew at the time of the mishap. The first category is a flight 
mishap (FM) which is defined as a mishap where “there is intent for flight and damage to 
a DOD aircraft of UAV or the loss of a DOD manned aircraft” which includes any 
mishaps that occur in flight, or during take-off and landing periods. The second category 
is a flight related mishap (FRM), which is defined as a mishap where “there is intent for 
flight and no reportable damage to the aircraft or UAV itself, but the mishap involves a 
fatality, reportable injury, or reportable property damage.” The third category is an 
aviation ground mishap (AGM) which is defined as a mishap where “there is no intent for 
flight that results in reportable damage to an aircraft or UAV or death or injury involving 
an aircraft or UAV” (Department of the Navy Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 
2014, pp. 3-15–3-16). The category and classification do not have an impact on the 
conduct of the investigation but are provided in this research to show the wide range of 
incidents that require the convening of an aviation mishap investigation. 
Prior to a mishap occurring, the Aviation Safety Officer is expected to have 
developed a Pre-Mishap Plan, and given training regarding the plan to the standing 
members of the Aviation Mishap Board (AMB), if not to the entire compliment of 
aviators in the squadron (Department of the Navy Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations, 2014, p. 2-8). For all Class A, B, and C which involve more than minor 
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injuries, mishaps the AMB is comprised of “at a minimum, an ASO, a flight surgeon, an 
officer well-qualified in aircraft maintenance, and an officer well-qualified in aircraft 
operations” (Department of the Navy Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 2014, p. 2-
8). The AMB is headed by a senior member (usually the squadron Executive Officer) 
appointed by the Commanding Officer, with the exception of Class A mishaps (in this 
case the senior member is assigned from an outside command). This is the minimum staff 
on an AMB, and the researcher has observed AMBs that had numerous specialists 
depending on the nature of the incident. 
The standing members of the AMB are, with the exception of the flight surgeon 
all pilots or flight officers who may potentially be involved in the mishap (piloting 
aircraft, eye witness, etc.), which leads to the need for alternates who are also trained and 
ready to conduct the investigation. Additionally, in the event of a mishap, the AMB 
members may be off-duty and may not be able to immediately begin to conduct the 
investigation. The researcher has observed that when a mishap occurs, the initial period 
can be chaotic with numerous tasks from the Pre-Mishap Plan being executed 
simultaneously. In these circumstances, the ASO has been observed to not proceed to the 
investigation site until the initial tasks are completed (reporting and notifications of 
higher headquarters units, etc.). The need for the members of the AMB to work 
autonomously and collaboratively, without the guidance of the ASO is imperative to 
collecting the necessary evidence for the investigation. 
Following the initial evidence collection in a mishap investigation, it is likely that 
further evidence collection will be required. Witnesses are likely to be interviewed and 
re-interviewed. Numerous external agencies such as weather, air traffic control, and local 
law enforcement are likely to coordinate with and provide information to the AMB. The 
result of the many disparate tasks in an investigation is that large period of time can pass 
between AMB members meeting face to face. In the Senior Member Guide (2010), the 
senior member is advised to establish meeting times, to have each member report on their 
status, and then set goals for (and the time and date of) the next meeting. 
The researcher has observed the completion of the AMB process in weeks for 
more minor investigations, and in months for more major investigations. 
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Interchangeability of AMB members is necessary in circumstances where an individual 
must execute a permanent change of station (PCS) move, deploy, or conduct a temporary 
assigned duty (TAD). With an appropriately designed application installed on a CMD, it 
is possible that the aviation mishap investigation process could be improved. 
2. Researcher Experience 
The researcher attended the Naval School of Aviation Safety in Pensacola, Florida 
in 2010, receiving certification as a qualified Aviation Safety Officer (ASO). Following 
completion of ASO certification, the researcher held the billet of Squadron Aviation 
Safety Officer and Director of Safety and Standardization. The researcher has experience 
as a AMB member on multiple mishap investigations that span each of the severity 
classifications (Class A, B, C, etc.) and each subcategory (FM, FRM, & AGM). 
Additionally, the researcher has acted as ASO for a mishap involving a different 
squadron than the researcher was assigned to, due to the involvement of that squadron’s 
ASO in the mishap. The researcher has experienced first-hand the need for 
interchangeability of AMB members, and collaboration among those members in order to 
complete the investigation in a timely manner. 
3. Case Explanation 
Aviation mishaps are an uncommon occurrence, and in the case of many 
squadrons in the Navy and Marine Corps, an ASO has the potential to complete a two- to 
three-year tour and not experience a single mishap. The latest statistics from the Naval 
Safety Center (2016) show that in the last 12 months (July 2015 to July 2016) the Navy 
had seven Class A (FM) mishaps and 12 Class B (FM) mishaps, while the Marine Corps 
had six Class A (FM) mishaps and three Class B (FM) mishaps. This equates to a Class A 
(FM) mishap rate for the Navy of .82 mishaps per 100,000 flying hours, and a Class A 
(FM) mishap rate for the Marine Corps of 2.48 mishaps per 100,000 flying hours (Naval 
Safety Center, 2016). This research is not intended to suggest that CMD technology 
would lower these mishap rates, only that the technology could improve the ability to 
conduct an investigation when necessary. 
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In the event of a mishap, the first person notified is the Marine assigned to 
Operations Duty Officer (ODO) in the squadron ready room. This Marine is generally, 
although not necessarily, a more junior aviator in the squadron, and is notified through a 
radio transmission or a phone call from some external agency such as air traffic control, 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), local police, etc. The ODO is often responsible 
for initiating the Pre-Mishap Plan, and locating the Mishap Kit, which holds the 
investigation-specific items needed by the initial responders and the AMB. Often, the 
members of the standing AMB are not present for duty at the time of the incident or are 
involved in the mishap themselves. In these situations, the ASO or other command 
representative directs initial responders to the investigation site to begin evidence 
collection (pictures, materials, etc.). 
The researcher has observed that in the event of a mishap, the initial responders 
collect the pictures and videos on their personal CMD or personal digital camera and 
provide the materials to the AMB. These photos can be of a sensitive nature, and need at 
least some level of control exercised over them. It is important to note, that OPNAVINST 
3750.6S (2014) does not consider these pictures and video “privileged information” 
unless they are “staged by the AMB (i.e., photographs that are preplanned or posed to 
illustrate a specific condition or situation.” The order also includes photographs that have 
captions or markings on them “indicative of the AMB’s deliberative process” as 
privileged information. Privileged information is required to be safeguarded against 
disclosure through “public release and non-safety uses” (Department of the Navy Office 
of the Chief of Naval Operations, 2014, p. 1-28). 
The Naval Safety Center (NAVSAFECEN) is responsible to the Chief of Naval 
Operations (CNO), for managing all safety matters in the Navy and Marine Corps 
including the Naval Aviation Safety Management System (Department of the Navy 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 2014, p. 1-1). The NAVSAFECEN uses the 
online system Web-Enabled Safety System (WESS) for the electronic development and 
submission of Safety Investigation Reports (SIREP) by Navy and Marine Corps units. 
The aviation mishap specific portion of this system is called WESS Aviation Mishaps & 
Hazards Reporting System (WAMHRS). 
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WAMHRS allows each the AMB to store evidence, points of contact, general 
information, and weather data for reference throughout the investigation. The system is 
also used for each AMB member to write their respective portion of the SIREP. Access to 
WESS and WAMHRS is controlled by the Commanding Officer through the ASO, and 
access to the SIREP in the system is further controlled by the ASO and the AMB senior 
member. A CAC with public key infrastructure (PKI) is required to access the system, 
and the system is only stated to be compatible with the Internet Explorer web browser 
(Department of the Navy Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 2014, p. 4-1). 
It is possible that WESS and WAMHRS could be updated to allow access to a 
wider range of operating systems and web browsers. However, it may be more beneficial 
to develop a mobile application that could allow AMB members to upload investigation 
materials to the WESS and WAMHRS. Compartmentalizing and limiting access to the 
system through the application could potentially improve the confidentiality and integrity 
of the system while improving accessibility. In order to allow a CMD to access WESS 
and WAMHRS, this research has developed several COAs. 
4. Potential Courses of Action 
These solutions are limited to the specifics of this particular case. These COAs 
will be discussed in terms of the potential CMD implementation strategy categories, and 
CIA Triad considerations. 
This research assumes that the majority of the Marines that are assigned to (or 
could be expected to be assigned to) the AMB have a personally owned CMD that they 
are familiar with operating. Additionally, it is assumed that WESS and WAMHRS can be 
made compatible with additional operating systems and web browsers. With these 
assumptions, the following COAs were developed to potentially address the availability 
issue described in this case. 
a. HYOD with App-Based Access (Case 3, COA 1) 
In a HYOD implementation strategy, NAVSAFECEN would be responsible for 
contracting the development of a mobile application that was compatible with WESS and 
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WAMHRS. The Navy and Marine Corps would be responsible for procuring the CMDs, 
maintaining the CMDs and contracts for wireless access. This COA would allow 
NAVSAFECEN the ability to restrict access to WESS and WAMHRS on the mobile 
application to only those specific devices that the government procured. 
The Marine Corps has a limited CMD HYOD implementation program that 
allows “privileged users” to obtain a government furnished device if the user is identified 
as “being mission critical or mission essential” (Anderson, 2013, p. 11). The researcher 
has observed that in a Marine Corps aviation squadron the Commanding Officer, 
Executive Officer and Sergeant Major are often deemed “privileged users” under this 
program. This COA could essentially be an expansion of this program to include the 
standing members of the AMB. This research suggests that the unit ASO be responsible 
for these additional devices, and maintain them in the units Mishap Kit rather than 
distribute them to the standing AMB members. The ASO would then have control over 
the devices, and be responsible for training the standing AMB members and alternates on 
the devices use in the event of a mishap. 
It is likely that in an HYOD implementation, only one type of CMD would be 
selected thereby reducing the necessity to make WESS and WAMHRS compatible with 
multiple operating systems or web browsers. 
b. CYOD with App-Based Access (Case 3, COA 2) 
In a CYOD implementation, the NAVSAFECEN would have the same 
responsibilities as the previous COA with the additional responsibility of making the 
application compatible with multiple CMD configurations. The Navy and Marine Corps 
responsibility would remain the same with the additional responsibility of providing 
multiple CMD configurations that the individual or unit could choose from. 
Similar to Case 2, COA 2, the researcher has observed that standing AMB 
member assignment can change frequently, and it may be more timely and cost efficient 
to allow the squadron Commanding Officer or IT staff to decide on a mix of various 
approved devices that are distributed. In this scenario, the potential exists that some of the 
AMB members would be issued a device that they are less familiar with. The majority of 
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the AMB members are officers of the ranks O-3 through O-6 (with four to 30 years of 
commissioned service), however, and would likely adapt quickly to the device with 
minimal adversity. 
c. BYOD with App-Based Access (Case 3, COA 3) 
In a BYOD implementation, the NAVSAFECEN would have the same 
responsibilities as COA 2. The Navy and Marine Corps would be responsible for making 
the application available to individuals on their own device, as well as limited technical 
support. The individual units would likely be responsible for controlling which 
individuals have access to their units WESS and WAMHRS information. This COA 
would potentially allow the greatest number of people to collaborate on an investigation, 
while limiting the cost to the government to developing a mobile application. 
It would likely be the responsibility of the ASO to manage WESS and WAMHRS 
and only allow access to individuals that are authorized. Additionally, the ASO would 
likely need the ability to revoke access of an individual at the completion of an 
investigation. 
5. Case Summary 
This case looked at the possibility of using CMDs to improve collaboration, 
information availability and accessibility in order to more efficiently and effectively 
investigate an aviation mishap. This case is applicable to all Navy and Marine Corps 
aviation units conducting an aviation mishap investigation in a garrison environment 
where wireless mobile access is available. Additionally, an appropriately developed 
application with access to WESS and WAMHRS could potentially benefit non-aviation 
units in the Navy and Marine Corps conducting other safety investigations (non-aviation 
mishaps). This is outside the scope of this research and would need to be examined in 
follow on research to determine applicability to those processes. 
E. SUMMARY 
This research has developed three independent case studies involving the 
implementation of CMD technology with mobile application based access that have the 
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potential to improve information availability and accessibility of the end user. Each case 
has been presented with multiple course of action for implementation, each with varying 
risks and benefits from the perspective of the end-user, and the organization. The cases 
and their purposed courses of action will be analyzed based on risk and benefits to the 
individual and the organization. In analyzing the risks and benefits, this research will 
seek to understand how the individual and the technology are likely to interact (socio-
technical systems theory) and how likely the individual is to accept the new technological 
capability (using the technology acceptance model).  
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IV. ANALYSIS
The three case studies developed in this research examine scenarios in which the 
United States Marine Corps (USMC) could potentially implement commercial mobile 
device (CMD) technology into business processes. Commercial sector businesses like 
Intel Corporation have utilized CMD technology to revolutionize the way their 
employees work, learn, socialize, organize, and entertain themselves. It is possible that 
this technology could similarly revolutionize the USMC. 
In research done by Mercado and Spain (2014, p. 7), mobile device ownership 
was 79% in the U.S. Army, with the youngest age group (20 years old and under) at 
94% ownership, and it is possible that the USMC has similar levels of ownership. 
This younger demographic of Marines are the future Non-Commissioned Officers 
(NCO), Staff Non-Commissioned Officers (SNCO), and junior and mid-grade 
commissioned officers that are at the forefront of day to day operations and training 
in Marine Corps units. These younger Marines are considered “digital natives” in that 
they were raised with the Internet, computers, mobile phones and digital 
technologies (Prensky, 2001). These “digital natives” come to the USMC pre-
programmed and trained to operate on CMDs. The challenge for leaders within the 
USMC is to determine how to garner the benefits of using CMDs while limiting the 
detrimental security impacts these devices can have on the network. 
The analysis presented in this research is both general and specific. General risks 
and benefits will be analyzed and applied to the USMC. Additionally, each individual 
case will be analyzed independently with a focus on Socio-technical Systems Theory, and 
the Technology Acceptance Model. Within the analysis of each individual case the 
independent courses of action (COA) will be analyzed based on the Confidentiality, 
Integrity, and Availability (CIA) Triad risks and benefits. 
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A. GENERAL ANALYSIS OF CMD IMPLEMENTATION IN THE USMC 
Metcalfe’s Law described the value of the network, as seen by those users on the 
network, as increasing “as the square of the number of users: V ~ N2” (Metcalfe, 2013, 
p.26). Value as it is seen here is not necessarily in monetary terms, but more in utility of 
the network to serve its intended purpose. The researcher observed this law in the 
introduction of the Blue Force Tracker (BFT) to the battlefield in Afghanistan during 
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. The value of the BFT to the researcher, as a pilot 
operating in Afghanistan, was minimal in the early stages of the introduction, because a 
relatively small number of users were on the network and even fewer had enough 
familiarity with the system to operate it. As the BFT gained popularity as a 
communications and situational awareness tool, the value of the BFT increased 
exponentially. 
It is possible that the greatest single benefit related to CMD usage in the USMC 
would be the increase in the number of people that would have access to the network. 
This could allow these individuals to help create value to the Marine Corps by increasing 
their work efficiency and effectiveness. Conversely, this potential greatest benefit could 
also be one of the greatest sources of risk associated with CMD use. This is due to the 
risk associated with increasing the number of potential access points to the network, 
which increases the attack surface area for individuals and organizations intending to 
cause harm. 
Many of the advantages regarding CMD usage are closely tied to a disadvantage 
of that usage. The benefits of CMD usage at work are broadly thought of as falling into 
three categories: reduction of IT procurement cost, increasing employee productivity, and 
gaining an organizational competitive advantage (Chandrasekhar, 2013, p. 6). These three 
categories are used in this research in order to provide a framework of general analysis 
for implementing CMD technology. 
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1. Cost Related Risks and Benefits 
In the CMD implementation cases of the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade 
Bureau (TTB), the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and the 
State of Delaware each organization cited cost related factors as a major reason for 
pursuing their new technology policies (White House, 2012). The researcher has 
observed that cost savings is a major factor in an organization deciding to pursue CMD 
technology. In many cases, infrastructure and equipment costs are reduced, while costs in 
technical support have been observed to increase. 
a. Infrastructure and Equipment Related Savings 
CMD technology has the potential to decrease the necessity of a desktop or laptop 
computer in business processes. The TTB was spending nearly $2 million every three to 
four years to replace outdated desktop and laptop computers. By implementing CMD 
technology into their business processes, they were able to save $1.2 million of that 
$2 million in infrastructure and equipment costs (White House, 2012). The State of 
Delaware’s CMD implementation resulted in a 45% reduction in infrastructure expenses, 
and a 15% reduction in wireless costs (White House, 2012). The EEOC had already 
implemented CMD technology with their workforce and shifted from organizationally 
owned and provided devices to employee owned devices. By providing a subsidy to their 
employees for wireless service costs, they were able to decrease their monthly costs 
related to wireless service by 20–30% (White House, 2012). These are only three 
examples of an organization achieving infrastructure savings by implementing CMD 
technology. 
Intel Corp. recognized that costs were reduced in terms of procurement of 
devices, however they also determined that costs increased elsewhere due to the necessity 
of evaluating devices, ensuring proper configuration, and continuing to support these 
devices (Chandrasekhar, 2013, p. 2). The decrease in procurement costs is tied to the 
particular device implementation strategy that is selected. For instance, the here’s your 
own device (HYOD) system has significantly higher procurement costs but potentially 
lower configuration and support costs when compared to the more open bring your own 
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device (BYOD) system which can allow for almost no procurement cost on the 
organization. 
Loss or damage to desktop and laptop computers is another significant 
infrastructure cost. Mobile computing devices are recognized as being more susceptible 
to be loss, theft, and exploitation than laptop and desktop computing devices located in an 
office space (Department of Defense Chief Information Officer, 2006). Allowing 
employees to bring their own devices could reduce hardware loss. Intel lost one percent 
of its laptop computers each year due to employee carelessness and theft (Chandrasekhar, 
2013, p. 3). A BYOD implementation would reduce the monetary cost to the USMC in 
the event of a lost or stolen device, however the cost associated with the potential damage 
caused by that stolen/lost device being used for nefarious purposes could quickly offset 
the savings. 
b. Technical Support Increases 
The infrastructure savings associated with CMD implementation have been 
observed to cause increased technical support costs. Organizations have been observed to 
see their costs grow dramatically due to the need to “support mobile device access to 
organizational resources and to help reduce risks when, not if, these devices are lost, 
stolen, or damaged” (Harvard Business Review Analytic Services, 2014, p. 1). The IT 
professionals that addressed the implementation of CMDs in Intel Corp. were concerned 
with the additional workload related to providing support for an increasing number of 
different devices each with differing configurations, operating systems, and levels of 
security or encryption (Chandrasekhar, 2013). 
Any CMD implementation in the USMC could potentially increase the cost 
related to technical support. The USMC may need to hire civilian technical support staff 
or train more uniformed technical support staff. 
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c. Wireless Contracts 
Wireless contracts can be expensive, and the costs related to the USMC funding 
of wireless contracts for all employees could have detrimental effects on the overall 
budget. The necessity of the Marine Corps to provide some sort of subsidy to offset the 
wireless contract costs to the individual is likely to be related to the type of 
implementation used and the degree to which the implementation mandates use. If the 
implementation allows employees the option to use their own device, the need to 
subsidize the wireless contract cost could be minimized. However, mandating the use of 
CMDs in a process could potentially lead to a situation where the USMC would be 
required to provide full funding for an employee’s wireless contract. 
In the cases of TTB, EEOC, and State of Delaware each organization was faced 
with a decision regarding the organization paying for employee wireless contracts. If an 
organization desires to subsidize the employees wireless contract costs they have several 
options ranging from paying the entire employee costs to providing a regular fixed 
stipend. In the case of the State of Delaware, the organization categorized users based on 
the mobile necessity of their job and then determines that employee’s eligibility for 
wireless cost reimbursement. A determination by the organization not to compensate the 
employee for wireless costs did not preclude that employee from using their personal 
CMD (White House, 2012). This research recommends a similar policy in the USMC, 
allowing the maximum number of employees to benefit while only requiring subsidies for 
employees that require mobility in the completion of their duties. 
2. Productivity Related Risks and Benefits 
The business of defending United States in an increasingly globalized and 
interconnected world is complex and seems to become more difficult over time. This 
complexity results in DOD employees being required to “do more with less,” which 
results in a desire to increase productivity and efficiency. Extensive research has been 
done by psychologists and companies to determine if the proliferation of digital 
communications devices is having a positive or negative effect on human productivity. 
Microsoft Canada (2015, p. 6), conducted a study on 2000 Canadians of various age, sex, 
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and technology use demographics and determined that overall, the human attention span 
has decreased from around 12 seconds in the year 2000 to eight seconds, which is slightly 
less than the nine-second attention span of the average goldfish. The popularity of 
smartphones, tablets, and the constant connectivity these technologies provide is unlikely 
to decrease, therefore it is beneficial to understand how these devices can be used to 
increase productivity and how they can be used to distract. 
a. Increasing Employee Productivity 
CMD implementation has the potential to allow employees to connect, 
collaborate, and be productive at anytime from anywhere that has connectivity. The 
DOD, and more specifically the Marine Corps operate around the globe and around the 
clock. Marines are indoctrinated into the mindset that they are “Marines 24/7.” This 
mindset is intended to instill the idea that the standards of conduct and values of a Marine 
are expected to be adhered to at all times, but in the digital age it has carried over into the 
way many Marines work. Marines are not explicitly required to have a personal mobile 
phone, but the researcher has observed that using a mobile phones email/text/voice 
capability is a primary means of conducting communications in a garrison environment. 
This is more common among the “key billet holders” (Commanding Officer, Executive 
Officer, etc.) who are required to be continuously on-call to make a decision or authorize 
action upon notification through their device. 
The Marine Corps has recognized the value of CMDs in increasing command and 
control when connected to the Marine Corps Enterprise Network (MCEN), but currently 
limits the program to only government furnished equipment (GFE) and “privileged users” 
(Anderson, 2013, p. 11). “Privileged users” are limited based on the size of and budgetary 
authority of a unit, usually consisting of the more senior “key billet holders” of the unit. 
This leaves the remaining members of the unit to connect through their personal CMD, 
with no connectivity to the MCEN, limiting their ability to be productive outside of the 
confines of their workspace. Armano (2012) said, “it’s not about mobile as much as it is 
about understanding mobility.” The intent of any policy addressing CMD implementation 
needs to address the idea of mobility, not necessary mobile. “Mobility means 
 69
information, convenience, and social all served up on the go, across a variety of screen 
sizes and devices” (Armano, 2012). 
Currently, the Department of Defense (DOD) and USMC are heavily dependent 
on desktop computers, or laptop computers that must remain plugged into a specific 
Ethernet port, which limits the mobility of the device and ultimately the productive 
capability of the employee tethered to that device. The researcher has observed that the 
mobile phone decreased the necessity of a land-line telephone, and in much the same 
way, CMDs are decreasing the necessity of stationary desktop/laptop in the office. 
Harvard Business Review Analytic Services (2014, p. 2) research found that 85% 
of employees regularly used their mobile phone for work related activities, 65% of 
employees said BYOD made them more efficient at work, 51% said customer service 
improved, and 47% reported enhanced employee satisfaction. Following their BYOD 
implementation, Intel Corp. determined that their employees averaged a 57-minute daily 
increase in time spent on company-related work (Chandrasekhar, 2013, p. 6). The 
researcher has observed CMD proliferation and usage by Marines in USMC aviation 
squadrons and infantry units to be similar to the 85% employee usage statistic in the 
previously mentioned study. The researcher has observed these employees use their 
devices to conduct their daily work, in a limited capacity because of the restrictions on 
connecting their device to the MCEN. Allowing these employees to access the MCEN 
with CMDs could allow the USMC to see similar productivity and employee satisfaction 
gains to the previously mentioned study. 
Marines own CMDs and in some circumstances have their device with them in 
the workplace. Employers must understand that their employees will “Interact with their 
mobile device” an average of 150 times per day (Panepinto, 2014). These mobile devices 
have become a primary interaction tool that affects how employees get their news and 
entertainment, how they learn, and how they fill at least some of their “white space” time 
during the day (Panepinto, 2014). Designing enterprise specific applications has helped 
companies and organizations achieve enhanced productivity (Panepinto, 2014). The 
Marine Corps could potentially design and develop Marine Corps specific applications 
and enhance employee productivity. 
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In practice, personally owned CMDs have an ability to provide access to an 
incredibly large amount of information that is well above that which is necessarily 
needed to complete daily tasks and/or be processed in the time available to complete 
those tasks. Rosen & Samuel (2015) discussed the need to better streamline the 
information individuals expose themselves to in a given day to only that which is 
necessary to complete the task assigned. This could be difficult to accomplish in the 
DOD, where constant situational awareness on a wide variety of tasks is often considered 
necessary in order to maintain good command and control. The researcher has observed 
one particular example of this issue in the use of the carbon copy (CC) and blind carbon 
copy (BCC) Email capability. The use of this capability has been observed to fill an 
individual’s Email Inbox with messages that could potentially have little value to that 
individuals assigned tasks and provide an overload of information, negatively affecting 
productivity. 
b. Devices of Digital Distraction 
Allowing CMD use in the workplace has the potential to result in in decreased 
productivity through some employees experiencing a level of distraction due to their 
devices. “The constant availability of information and entertainment takes advantage of 
our easily distracted minds” (Evans, 2015). In a study done by Ricoh Americas 
Corporation (2014), over three-quarters of employees used their device to check personal 
emails, two-thirds sent personal texts, and over one-third checked social media accounts 
or played games while at work. No company or organization that observes the results of 
this study is likely to be pleased with the amount of time that is spent on non-work 
activities. This same study described how the younger workers (18–34) were twice as 
likely as the next-closest age demographic to access social media or games on their 
device during work hours (Ricoh Americas Corporation, 2014). The uniformed portion of 
the USMC is largely represented by this younger worker demographic (18–34), and it 
could expect that allowing greater usage of CMD in the workplace may lead to some 
workers succumbing to the distracting capability of their devices. 
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Multi-tasking is one way in which employees attempt to achieve greater 
efficiency in their work day. The evidence is not entirely supportive of this belief, in that 
the ability to effectively do two things at the same time is only possible when one task is 
“automatic” (Rosen & Samuel, 2015). Therefore, employees who believe they can 
effectively pay attention in a meeting and check their email at the same time are 
potentially neglecting one task or the other, or both. In the USMC, this issue could lead to 
important information being missed during a meeting, and lost efficiency due to mistakes 
and re-work. 
CMDs have the ability to cause a digital distraction even when the user does not 
actually interact with the device (Stothart, Mitchum, & Yehnert, 2015, pp. 893–897). 
Current public service announcement campaigns on television, radio, etc., are concerned 
with the increased rate of vehicular accidents caused by drivers who are distracted and 
interacting with their devices. Large numbers of videos posted on websites like You Tube 
show distracted device users walking into fountains in public places or other 
embarrassing and dangerous situations. Stothart et al. (2015, pp. 893–897) conducted a 
study on students at Florida State University to determine the effect of various device 
notification stimuli on the participant’s ability to perform a task that required sustained 
attention. In their experiment, they attempted to distract the test subject with either a text 
message or a phone call and compared the results to a control group. The result of their 
study was that the decrease in performance of their test subjects who received calls or 
texts was similar in magnitude to the decrease in performance of distracted drivers, even 
when the subjects did not actively interact with their device (Stothart et al., 2015, p. 896). 
These findings are applicable to the potential distractive capability of these 
devices in a USMC workplace. The USMC could possibly anticipate that a mechanic 
working on a difficult vehicular maintenance procedure, with his/her CMD nearby, 
receives a phone call that goes unanswered, but for a brief distracted second makes an 
error that is potentially costly or catastrophic. Or, perhaps a helicopter pilot is flying a 
training mission and is momentarily distracted by the subtle vibration of an incoming text 
to the CMD in his/her flight suit pocket. These devices have an undeniable ability to draw 
attention away, both long-term and short-term, from essential tasks. 
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It is possible that CMD technology in the workplace is both a cause of digital 
distraction and if appropriately utilized a productivity tool. It should be the goal of a 
CMD implementation policy to recognize the distraction capability and address it with 
appropriate expectations of employee behavior. The policy should also recognize the 
finite nature of the human attention span and use the technology to increase the 
productivity of the workforce. Evans (2015) recommendation for overcoming digital 
distraction was to ensure that emphasizing the use of productivity enhancing applications, 
encouraging employees to take a break from their devices during their work day, and 
disabling the notifications on their device to decrease the distracting capabilities. 
The research done by Microsoft Canada (2015) has interesting insights that show 
how digital devices can act as both a productivity tool and a distraction device. For 
instance, if the DOD or USMC desires to increase the effectiveness of annual training, it 
would be beneficial to understand that a prolonged training period on the dangers of 
drinking and driving may not be as effective as putting a short message and a picture on 
an Internet access “splash page” before employees are able to access the Internet on their 
devices. Microsoft Canada (2015, p. 7) research also showed that 77% of 18- to 24-year-
olds reach for their smartphone “When nothing is occupying my attention.” By 
understanding this reality and tailoring training to be conducted anywhere at any time on 
any device and for any duration, we may be able to see the increased effectiveness. 
3. Gaining Organizational Competitive Advantage 
The USMC does not necessarily have a business competitor in the way 
commercial organizations compete against each other for market share. The USMC does 
compete with other organizations (commercial sector and government) for quality 
employees both uniformed and civilian. This research addresses the competitive 
advantage that the USMC could gain in terms of recruiting and retaining a high quality 
workforce by pursuing a CMD implementation strategy. 
Any implementation of CMD technology that enables the workforce to achieve 
mobility and the ability to conduct business process from non-standard locations could be 
seen as similar to the DOD Telework Policy. This policy recognizes that telework 
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policies “can serve as an effective recruitment and retention strategy” and “enhance DOD 
efforts to employ and accommodate people with disabilities” (Department of Defense, 
2012, p. 2). 
Gaining an organizational competitive advantage must be analyzed over a long 
time period. It is also the most difficult of the benefits to monetize, due to the fact that the 
use of CMDs is seen as an enabler to the human talent of the organization. As employees 
have the ability to network more easily, and access their work from anywhere at any time 
the company the potential of those employees to benefit the organization is likely to 
increase (Chandrasekhar, 2013). One way the USMC could gain a competitive advantage 
is by developing a positive perception among potential recruits that the Marine Corps is a 
forward leaning organization in the area of IT. 
Today’s recruits—your new employees—live on their mobile devices. 
They’re going to judge you by how well your company allows them to 
live on them as well. With competition for tech talent at an all-time high 
and mobile tech savviness a common characteristic of new employees, 
demonstrating that your org “gets” the new IT landscape is incredibly 
important. (Panepinto, 2014) 
The Marine Corps could benefit from recognizing the nature of their future 
employees and their concerns and desires with regard to their future employer. 
Implementing CMD technology into Marine Corps business processes, and increasing the 
mobility of the workforce could make the organization a more attractive place for high 
quality employees to work, which would potentially lead to a long term competitive 
advantage. 
4. General Analysis Summary 
Any implementation of CMD technology in the USMC is likely to have risks and 
benefits from the standpoint of the organization and the individual. Assessing the cost, 
productivity, and competitive advantage related risks and benefits is a good starting point 
for analyzing CMD implementation. The key to successful implementation of this 
technology is in analyzing the specific technology, how it is intended to be incorporated 
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into the business processes, and mitigating the risks in order to better understand specific 
risks and benefits. 
B. CASE 1 ANALYSIS 
In the background and explanation of case study 1, the use of CMD technology 
was presented as a potential means of addressing resource limitations and improving the 
efficiency of training and education in Marine Corps. This case focused on the capability 
to fill potential “white space” in a unit’s schedule by increasing the availability of 
computer based training modules. The use of CMDs in an educational environment is 
more commonly referred to as “mobile learning” and is defined as “the exploitation of 
ubiquitous handheld technologies, together with wireless and mobile phone networks to 
facilitate, support and enhance and extend the reach of teaching and learning” (Brown, 
2010). 
1. Sociotechnical Systems Theory Analysis 
The key to determining the degree in which the benefits will be realized in any 
implementation requires analysis of the intersection of the new technology and the 
workforce. In order to accomplish this analysis, this research uses Sociotechnical 
Systems (STS) theory. A key part of this theory recognizes that a technology change in 
the organization is unlikely to succeed without a corresponding change in that 
organizations workforce. 
In terms of the social impact on the organization of implementing this technology, 
it is unlikely that the authority structure, and the relationships among people would 
change (Bostrom & Heinen, 1977). Using an application to access training and education 
resources from a CMD does not require the Marine Corps to restructure its hierarchal 
organization. In the limited implementation of this case, interpersonal relationships would 
change only in that collaboration in certain training situations could be accomplished 
electronically rather than face to face. The “reward system” in terms of rewarding the 
Marines for completing their training already exists. Assuming that all Marines desire to 
be promoted to the next higher rank, the system already rewards Marines with points 
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towards promotion (junior enlisted Marines), and promotion boards give consideration to 
those Marines that actively pursue education. 
Possibly the greatest social impact of implementing this technology in Case 1 is 
the minor changes in the attitudes and values that would be necessary. Marines would be 
required to demonstrate the maturity to use the devices for training and education during 
working hours, and not use them to look at social media or play games. This could result 
in greater reliance on SNCOs and NCOs to supervise their Marines use of these devices. 
Requiring these Marines to focus on supervision rather than their own training and 
education will then result in those SNCOs and NCOs being required to spend time 
outside of their normal working hours to complete their own training and education. This 
is not significantly different from what the researcher has observed currently takes place 
in the Marine Corps. 
In terms of technical impact on the organization, this case assumes that the 
Marine Corps has the ability to develop a user friendly mobile application that provides 
access to computer based training and resources. Potential difficulties with regard to 
limiting access to only those individual authorized could create a situation in which the 
application is too difficult to access. Additionally, the issue of updating an individual 
Marine’s training record could add complexity to the system. MarineNet currently allows 
Marines to take courses online and then automatically updates their individual training 
record. In an environment where the application has access to the Internet, this is less of 
an issue. However, if the application has the ability to download training and resources to 
the CMD and complete the training in an offline mode then the application will need 
some means of updating MarineNet during a subsequent application to server connection. 
This case and the corresponding courses of action will have limited socio-
technical implications due to the similarity between the current state of the process and 
the process following the implementation of CMDs in order to increase training and 
education availability. A larger issue for this case will be the acceptance of the 
technology at the end user level. 
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2. Technology Acceptance Model Considerations 
Case 1 involves increasing the availability of the computer based training 
modules that the Marines already complete through desktop or laptop computers. This 
research makes the assumption that these Marines desire to complete their required 
training, and become more proficient in their particular specialty within the Marine 
Corps. The two key factors in assessing the acceptance of the technology by the end user 
are “Perceived Usefulness” and “Perceived Ease of Use” (Davis et al., 1989). 
In terms of perceived usefulness, the end user must make a personal decision 
regarding how useful he/she believes the new technology to be. If the assumption is made 
that the individual Marine desires to become more proficient in their specialty and desires 
to be promoted, then usefulness of this technology should be relatively high. Case 1 
proposes increasing availability of training and education resources to allow the 
individual the ability to more easily complete their required training. The issue in terms 
of acceptance of the technology will be whether or not the individual believes the 
usefulness outweighs any negative factors in terms of the ease of use of the technology. 
The perceived ease of use, will be impacted by the quality of the application itself 
and the course of action (COA) implemented. This research assumes that the application 
will have the ability to provide computer based education and training resources to the 
CMD in a format that does not distort the digital media and operates without significant 
degradation in the quality of the training in comparison to the current state. Therefore, if 
the training itself is of the same quality, the ease of use will be entirely dependent on the 
user’s ability to easily navigate the applications interface, find the training he/she desires, 
complete that training, and then update their personal training record. This ease of use 
could also depend on the user’s familiarity with the CMD that the application is running 
on. 
In COA 3 of this case the BYOD implementation strategy was proposed. A 
BYOD implementation would mean that the individual was able to access the training on 
a device of his/her choosing and therefore possibly more familiar with. The main ease of 
use issue regarding this COA is that some Marines may potentially not own a CMD. In 
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this case, those Marines would be required to borrow another individual’s CMD, which 
may be unfamiliar to him/her, which would decrease that individual’s perceived ease of 
use. 
The solution to this issue is COA 2, which requires the Marine Corps to furnish a 
CMD to each Marine or each unit. The choose your own device (CYOD) implementation 
strategy allows the individual to operate on a CMD that they are familiar with, and 
ensures that all Marines have access to a CMD to complete their training. This COA has 
the potential to result in a higher cost to the organization due to the fact that it requires 
the government to develop an application that can run on multiple platforms, and to 
furnish the CMDs to the individuals. 
COA 1, uses a here’s your own device (HYOD) implementation strategy, which 
could address the cost of developing an application that works across platforms, due to 
the government choosing to provide only one platform with compatibility. The 
government could also save money, in comparison to COA 2, by purchasing only one 
type CMD and therefore buying the devices in bulk. This COA however has the potential 
to lower the perceived ease of use of some individuals that may not be familiar with the 
provided CMD platform. Each of these COAs provides a give and take in terms of the 
degree to which they will be perceived as easy to use and useful to the individual. 
Using the Technology Acceptance Model, the end users should choose to use the 
new technology if the perceived usefulness is high in comparison to the negative aspects 
of the perceived ease of use. Therefore, if the application and the technology work well 
together and the individual believes they are useful in terms of their career development 
the technology should be accepted and used. If the application is difficult to operate, and 
the device is unfamiliar to the individual, the perceived ease of use is likely to be more of 




3. Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability Analysis 
Mobile learning through a CMD has the potential to increase productivity and 
collaboration in an educational environment. The IT policies at Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) recognize that their students’ success depends on “the availability, 
flexibility, reliability, and capacity of the NPS academic technology infrastructure” 
(Naval Postgraduate School, 2009, p. 10). However, the benefits of implementing this 
technology do come with some risks. These risks can be mitigated to some degree with 
an appropriate implementation strategy and the use of technologies like virtual desktop 
infrastructure (VDI), trusted platform module (TPM), mobile device management 
(MDM), and application access controls. These technologies can improve confidentiality 
and integrity; however, they are often associated with some decrease in availability from 
the end users prospective. 
Each COA presented in this case has varying levels of risk related to 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) from the perspective of the organization. 
The training and education resources that the application provides access to are, for the 
purposes of this research, not classified and confidentiality is a minor concern to the 
organization. Assuming that the application is developed with multi-factor authentication 
the Marine Corps could be reasonably assured that only those individuals that have a 
reason to access the resources are able to access the resources. The application should be 
set up in a manner that does not allow an individual to use the application to alter the 
training or resources in any way, which leaves only the issue of training record update 
integrity. The application should only be able to access and update the training record of 
the authenticated user using the device. 
One integrity issue that this technology would be vulnerable to fraudulent training 
completion. In this hypothetical scenario, a Marine gains access to the application and 
then allows another individual to complete the training for him/her. This issue is not 
likely to be prevented with any technology that the researcher is aware of. This researcher 
has not personally observed this occur, however it is an issue of the current MarineNet 
system. 
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With respect to the proposed COAs in this case study, COA 3 has the highest 
potential for risk in terms of CIA. Allowing individual Marines to access and store the 
organizational information from MarineNet on their personal devices is potentially riskier 
than a government furnished device. This would be due in part to the individual security 
settings of the personally owned device and the other applications installed on the device. 
COA 1 and COA 2 are essentially variations on a program that requires the government 
to furnish a device to the individual. Because the government furnishes the device, the 
government could potentially have greater oversight on the device and more tightly 
control the settings and applications, thereby potentially lowering the confidentiality and 
integrity risks. 
4. Analysis Summary 
Allowing CMD access to training and education courses and resources currently 
available on MarineNet in any of the COAs developed for this case study presents risk to 
the organization. The new technology has a risk of not being accepted by the individuals 
expected to utilize it, making the implementation unsuccessful. Additionally, risks exist 
in terms of confidentiality and integrity of the organizations data. The degree to which 
these risks are outweighed by the potential benefits should be considered before pursuing 
any of these COAs. 
C. CASE 2 ANALYSIS 
In the background and explanation of case study 2, the use of CMD technology 
was presented as a potential means of increasing collaboration and improving the 
efficiency of squadron flight schedule development in the Marine Corps. This case 
focused on the capability of key stakeholders to collaborate in the development and 
approval process of a squadron flight schedule. The daily flight schedule development 
and approval process was described in detail to show that a properly developed mobile 
application running on a CMD could provide make the process more efficient. 
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1. Sociotechnical Systems Theory Analysis 
The squadron daily flight schedule development and approval process is a very 
social process. In its current state, the process involves the technology only in the 
development, and after the approval. Through the use of an application running on CMDs 
in the hands of the key stakeholders, the technology is involved throughout the process. 
From a STS perspective, the implementation of this technology could have implications 
on the social and technical sides of the process. 
In terms of social impact, the implementation of this technology could alter the 
relationships among the key stakeholders. In this implementation, the application would 
have the ability to allow real time collaboration between all of the key stakeholders, and 
potentially the Commanding Officer during all stages of flight schedule development. 
This change in relationships among the key stakeholders is one of the major potential 
benefits of implementing CMD technology into this process. Rather than the current 
system of developing the schedule and allowing each individual key stakeholder to make 
his/her changes with no visibility of those change to the others, this technology is 
proposed to allow real time visibility of those changes. The benefit of altering the 
relationships and increasing collaboration would be to decrease the work and re-work 
time of the schedule. 
In terms of the technical impact, this technology should decrease the complexity 
of the process. Decreasing complexity and increasing the efficiency in terms of time is 
the major benefit of the technology in this case. If the application and the implementation 
of the technology increases complexity of the process, then the implementation would 
likely fail. 
2. Technology Acceptance Model Considerations 
Case 2 involves the development of an application allowing collaborative 
capability in squadron flight schedule development. The main technology factor in this 
case is the application and its ability to run on a CMD. The collaborative capability and 
the mobility of the key stakeholder are the two biggest benefits gained by implementing 
this technology. Using the Technology Acceptance Model to analyze this case, each COA 
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is likely to have varying degrees of perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use from 
the perspective of the end user (key stakeholder). 
Perceived usefulness is the major factor in this case in determining how the 
technology will be accepted by the end user. The degree to which the key stakeholders 
believe the application increases collaboration, decreases the amount of time they spend 
on development and approval, and the additional freedom they have to complete the task 
away from their traditional workspace will all factor into the perceived usefulness of the 
technology. This research assumes that the application is developed to address these 
factors affecting perceived usefulness. Assuming that the application is developed for a 
specific CMD platform (as is the case in COA 1), or multiple platforms (as is the case in 
COA 2, and 3) there should be no difference in perceived usefulness between the 
respective COAs. 
The perceived ease of use of this technology is affected by the COA selected. In 
COA 1, a HYOD implementation plan was proposed. This COA has the potential for 
slightly lower perceived ease of use. This is due to the potential for a particular CMD 
platform being selected, and the individual key stakeholder lacking familiarity with that 
platform. COA 2 and COA 3 both decrease the likelihood of this outcome by increasing 
the number of platforms that are supported. Additionally, regardless of COA selected, if 
the application is developed without significant input from the individuals that are experts 
in the process, the potential exists that the application has low usefulness and low ease of 
use. In this scenario, the implementation is likely to fail to improve the process. 
3. Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability Analysis 
Similar to Case 1, CMD technology implementation in this case has the potential 
to benefit the process in terms of information availability. This benefit comes at a cost of 
potential threats to confidentiality and integrity of the data. Squadron daily flight 
schedules are not classified, but they are protected from disclosure for operational 
security reasons. The M-SHARP system contains personally identifiable information 
(PII) and unit readiness statistics that require protection from threats to confidentiality 
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and integrity. With access to the system, and bad intentions, an individual could 
potentially cause erroneous information to be inserted causing a lack of data integrity. 
Assuming that the application is developed with multi-factor authentication the 
Marine Corps could be reasonable assured that only those individuals that have a reason 
to access the resources are able to access the resources. This could prevent issues with 
regard to confidentiality. Additionally, the application could be set up in a manner that 
does not allow an individual to use the application to alter the readiness information in 
any way. In this configuration the application would be able to “read only” the readiness 
and qualification information in the system, and would be able to “write” only to the 
daily flight schedule. This would limit the potential for issues with integrity. 
Each individual COA would have slightly different risk levels with regard to CIA. 
COA 1 implementation, has the potential for the least risk. In this COA, the government 
owns all the devices that are able to use the application, and is responsible for 
maintaining the configuration and security of the CMDs. COA 2 has a potential has 
similar risk to COA 1. In this implementation, the government owns a selection of CMD 
platforms that the individual is able to use. The CIA risk is slightly higher here, due to the 
requirement of the government to manage multiple platforms settings and security. Each 
of these COAs has the potential to limit availability, due to the limited number of CMDs 
allotted to the unit. COA 3 increases availability due to the development of the 
application to run on multiple CMD platforms. Additionally, in this COA the number of 
devices with access to the system is limited by the number of authorized users the 
organization chooses to allow (assuming that all the key stakeholders and their alternates 
own a CMD). This COA has the potential for the highest risk in terms of confidentiality 
and integrity, in that it would require the organization to manage access. 
4. Analysis Summary 
Implementing CMD technology into the squadron daily flight scheduling process 
in any of the COAs developed for this case study presents risk to the organization. Risks 
exist in terms of confidentiality and integrity of the organizations data. Through an 
appropriately developed application, and diligent access management by the organization 
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these risks could potentially be mitigated to an acceptable level. The degree to which the 
resultant risk is outweighed by the potential benefits should be considered before 
pursuing any of these COAs. 
D. CASE 3 ANALYSIS 
In the background and explanation of Case 3, the use of CMD technology was 
presented as a potential means of increasing collaboration, interoperability, and 
improving the efficiency of the member assigned to conduct an aviation mishap 
investigation. This case focused on the issues of training the members of the board, 
changing out members of the board, and collaborating on the investigation. The aviation 
mishap investigation process was described to show the complexity of the process and 
that a properly developed mobile application running on a CMD could provide make the 
process more efficient. 
1. Sociotechnical Systems Theory Analysis 
The process of conducting an aviation mishap investigation is by its very nature a 
social process. In its current state, the process involves several individuals conducting 
investigative tasks within their area of expertise independently and then periodically 
collaborating to develop the investigation report. In this process, the individuals use 
personal CMDs to conduct portions of the investigation, but must use a laptop or desktop 
computer to input the evidence and findings into the online investigation report system. 
From a STS perspective, the implementation of this technology could have implications 
on the social and technical sides of the process. 
In terms of social impact, the implementation of this technology could alter the 
relationships among the mishap board members. In this implementation, the application 
would have the ability to allow members to collaborate during the investigation and 
development of the investigation report. The additional benefit of implementing this 
technology is the interchangeability of the members on the board. The application could 
allow new members to be assigned and removed from the board as desired by the 
Commanding Officer or investigative authority. The availability of the application on 
CMDs has the potential to allow any member of the squadron with the application to 
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collect digital evidence and provide it to the mishap board. If the application were 
developed with various roles, every member of the command with a CMD could be given 
the ability to take pictures or give statements to the board through the application, 
without having access to the entire body of evidence and findings. 
In terms of the technical impact, this technology is likely to increase the 
complexity of the process to a certain degree. Allowing a potentially larger group of 
individuals to collect evidence and provide that evidence to the board has the potential to 
cause redundant information to be provided. Additionally, this application could increase 
the amount of irrelevant information causing the investigation to potentially take more 
time to complete than necessary. 
The second technical impact is that the application is unlikely to replace the 
desktop or laptop in the development of the investigation report. CMDs are recognized as 
having a keyboard capability (either touchscreen or peripheral device), however the 
researcher has observed these devices to be cumbersome when doing a significant 
amount of writing in a text editor program. These technical issues and the social impact 
of this technology could impact the acceptance of this technology in the process. 
2. Technology Acceptance Model Considerations 
Case 3 involves the development of an application allowing data collection and a 
collaborative capability in investigating an aviation mishap. The main technology factor 
in this case is the application and its ability to run on a CMD. The mobility of the 
individuals conducting the investigation is the biggest benefit gained by implementing 
this technology. Using the Technology Acceptance Model to analyze this case, each COA 
is likely to have varying degrees of perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use from 
the perspective of the end user. 
Perceived usefulness is the major factor in this case in determining how the 
technology will be accepted by the end user. It is possible that the use of this technology 
is only perceived to be useful from the viewpoint of the Aviation Safety Officer and the 
members of the mishap board. These individuals could benefit, in terms of efficiency, 
through the ability to collect evidence and collaborate with other members of the board. 
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The degree to which these individuals believe these benefits will be realized through 
using CMD technology will directly impact their perception of usefulness. Assuming that 
the application is developed for a specific CMD platform (as is the case in COA 1), or 
multiple platforms (as is the case in COA 2, and 3) there should be no difference in 
perceived usefulness between the respective COAs. 
Similar to Case 2’s analysis, the perceived ease of use of this technology is 
affected by the COA selected. In COA 1, a HYOD implementation plan was proposed. 
This COA has the potential for slightly lower perceived ease of use, due to the potential 
for an individual lacking familiarity with the particular CMD platform selected. COA 2 
and COA 3 both decrease the likelihood of this outcome by increasing the number of 
platforms that are supported. Similar to Case 2’s analysis, if the application is developed 
without significant input from the experts in the process, the potential exists that the 
application has low usefulness and low ease of use. From the user’s perspective, if the 
application is well developed and runs on a CMD platform that he/she is familiar with, 
the technology should be perceived as having a high ease of use. If the user’s perception 
is that the positive benefits in terms of usefulness of the technology are higher than the 
negative aspects of ease of use, the technology could be accepted. 
3. Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability Analysis 
CMD technology implementation in this case has the potential to benefit the 
process in terms of mobility and collaboration. To gain these benefits, the CMD and the 
application increase the availability of data. This benefit comes at a cost of potential 
threats to confidentiality and integrity of that data. The system currently used in aviation 
safety investigation contains PII, and privileged information that require protection from 
threats to confidentiality and integrity. 
Similar to Case 2’s analysis, an individual with bad intentions could potentially 
cause erroneous information to be inserted causing a lack of data integrity. Beyond that, 
the compromise of privileged information could have criminal implications and cause 
embarrassment to the Department of Navy (DON). Additionally, the entire aviation 
safety mishap investigation process could experience a reluctance to provide information 
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by witnesses due to a fear that privileged information will be compromised on the new 
system. The need for confidentiality could supersede the desire for increased availability 
in this case. This research recognizes that if the CMD and application are unable to 
provide acceptable confidentiality of the data, then the implementation could fail. 
In this case, multi-factor authentication may not provide the DON enough 
assurance that only those individuals that have a reason to access the resources are able to 
access the resources. It may be necessary to create different roles in the application, that 
allow certain individuals the ability to put information into the system with no 
information retrieval capability, while allowing the investigation board members full 
access. In this scenario, any member of a squadron could have the application on their 
personal CMD and take pictures, record audio/video, and scan documents for upload into 
the system. Those individuals would have no ability to access anything in the system to 
include other data or board deliberations. This could prevent the disclosure of privileged 
information to an acceptable level and address potential integrity and confidentiality 
issues. 
Each individual COA would have slightly different risk levels with regard to CIA. 
COA 1 implementation has the potential for the least risk. In this COA, the government 
owns all the devices that are able to use the application, and is responsible for 
maintaining the configuration and security of the CMDs. This would provide the lowest 
risk to confidentiality and integrity, but would minimize the positive aspects of 
availability to only individuals with government furnished CMDs. COA 2 has a potential 
for similar risk to COA 1. In this implementation, the government owns a selection of 
CMD platforms that the individual is able to use. The CIA risk is slightly higher here, due 
to the requirement of the government to manage multiple platforms settings and security. 
COA 3 increases availability due to the development of the application to run on multiple 
CMD platforms. The number of devices with access to the system in this COA is limited 
by the number of authorized users the organization chooses to allow (assuming that all 
the key stakeholders and their alternates own a CMD). This COA has the potential for the 
highest risk in terms of confidentiality and integrity, in that it would require the 
organization to manage the roles of individuals using the application. 
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4. Analysis Summary 
Implementing CMD technology into the investigation process of an aviation 
mishap presents risk to the organization. In terms of confidentiality, disclosure of 
privileged information could be highly detrimental to the process. In terms of integrity, 
unauthorized or unwanted alteration of the data could lead to erroneous investigation 
findings leading to similar mishaps occurring. Through an appropriately developed 
application, and diligent role based access management by the organization these risks 
could potentially be mitigated to an acceptable level. The degree to which the resultant 
risk is outweighed by the potential benefits should be considered before pursuing any of 
these COAs. 
E. SUMMARY 
Each of the cases and their individual COAs vary in terms of risks and benefits to 
the organization. These cases represent three very different processes that could 
potentially benefit from allowing CMD technology in the USMC. This research analyzed 
each potential case and COA in terms of STS theory, the Technology Acceptance Model, 
and the CIA risks versus benefits. The specific analyses of each of these cases display 
that a single “best” implementation strategy for all processes is available. Each case 
should be looked at individually, and an individual solution selected in order to minimize 
the risks and maximize the benefits.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The cases developed in this research, and the corresponding analysis has shown 
that the implementation of commercial mobile devices (CMD) into business processes in 
the United States Marine Corps (USMC) is a complex balance between increasing 
information availability and information security. Each of the individual cases shows the 
complexity of the integration of the technology with the users in terms of sociotechnical 
systems (STS) theory. The cases show that, in terms of the technology acceptance model 
(TAM), that “perceived usefulness” is relatively constant between the courses of action 
(COA). However, “perceived ease of use” varies with the implementation strategy 
selected, which directly affects the user acceptance of the technology. Finally, the cases 
and analysis show that increasing availability of information has a corresponding 
elevated risk associated with the confidentiality and integrity of the information. 
B. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The findings and recommendations of this research make the assumption that the 
USMC desires to pursue implementing CMD technology in the individual case’s process. 
Within each individual case, a specific COA is recommended as the best choice from the 
perspective of the organization. It is assumed that the organization desires to minimize 
cost and risks, while maximizing user satisfaction and benefits. In some of these cases, an 
additional modified hybrid COA is recommended which would need to be researched in 
greater detail by follow-on studies to determine feasibility. 
1. Case 1 Findings 
Case 1 involved the use of CMD technology to address resource limitations and 
improve training and education efficiency in the USMC. The findings of the analysis of 
the individual implementation COAs are displayed in Table 3. 
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Table 3.   Case 1 Findings 
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The implementation of this technology has the potential to apply to all Marines in 
the USMC, both active duty and reservists. The number of potential users in this case 
could make the pursuit of COA 1 and COA 2 cost prohibitive, due to the requirement for 
the USMC to purchase devices for all. Due to this main factor, it is the recommendation 
of this research that COA 1 is pursued by the USMC. This COA minimizes the cost to the 
government in terms of purchasing CMDs and takes advantage of the devices that users 
already own. This COA also takes advantage of the user’s familiarity with their device, 
which could lead to a higher acceptance of the technology into the process. 
COA 3 could result in higher costs in terms of application compatibility and 
technical support. These potential costs are minimal in comparison to the cost of 
acquiring and maintaining the number of devices required in COA 1 and COA 2. The 
main weakness of selecting COA 3 is the expectation that potential users may not own a 
CMD. Because of this expectation, some users would potentially not have the ability to 
access the information and realize the benefits. It is therefore suggested that a hybrid 
COA may be the most beneficial. 
The possible hybrid COA involves selecting COA 3, and a limited COA 1 
implementation. In this COA, the application could be developed to run on user owned 
CMDs, providing access to those individuals. The USMC could then purchase a limited 
number of government furnished CMDs to the individual units for temporary loan to 
individuals that do not own their own CMD. This would present an additional cost to the 
government, but would maximize utilization of the technology. 
2. Case 2 Findings 
Case 2 involved the use of CMD technology to improve collaboration and 
efficiency in the squadron daily flight schedule development process. The findings of the 




Table 4.   Case 2 Findings 
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The implementation of this technology would affect a much smaller group of 
users than Case 1. This case only addressed USMC aviation squadron scheduling, and 
focused primarily on the interactions between key stakeholders in the process. The 
analysis of this case addressed the elevated need for confidentiality of personally 
identifiable information (PII) and maintaining the integrity of the squadron readiness 
data. Due to the relatively small number of potential CMDs requiring access, and the 
elevated risks, it is the recommendation of this research that either COA 1 or COA 2 be 
pursued by the USMC. 
COA 2 would result in the highest cost to the organization in terms of acquiring 
devices and providing them to the key stakeholders. The cost associated with COA 1 
could be slightly lower than COA 2, however COA 2 has the advantage of higher user 
familiarity and therefore higher “perceived ease of use” over COA 1. To maximize user 
familiarity and “perceived ease of use” in a COA 1 implementation, the USMC could do 
additional research on the key stakeholders to determine the most prevalent CMD among 
that group. 
The possibility of a hybrid implementation of CMD technology exists in this case 
where COA 1 or COA 2 is selected for the key stakeholders, while developing the 
application for use on user owned CMDs in a limited capacity. In this hybrid COA, the 
key stakeholders would use their government furnished CMD to collaborate on the 
development of the daily flight schedule. The remaining members of the squadron could 
access the application for information purposes, and providing their availability in the 
“snivel log.” Each authorized user in the squadron with a CMD could be allowed to see 
the daily/weekly/monthly flight schedules. Additionally, individual aircrew personnel 
could provide the Pilot Training Officer their availability to be scheduled based on their 
personal schedules. 
3. Case 3 Findings 
Case 3 involved the use of CMD technology to improve collaboration and 
efficiency in the investigation of aviation mishap. The findings of the analysis of the 
individual implementation COAs are given in Table 5. 
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Table 5.   Case 3 Findings 
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The implementation of this technology would affect a smaller group of users than 
Case 1 or Case 2. Additionally, the frequency of use of the technology is much less 
frequent than Case 1 or Case 2. The analysis of this case addressed the elevated need for 
confidentiality of privileged information and maintaining the integrity of the investigation 
data and findings. Due to the relatively small number of potential CMDs requiring 
access, the infrequent need for access, and the elevated risks, it is the recommendation of 
this research that COA 1 be pursued by the USMC. 
COA 1 has the lowest risk to the organization in terms of inappropriate disclosure 
of privileged information. This is important because, disclosure of this information could 
have catastrophic effects on trust and confidence in the mishap investigation process by 
potential witnesses. COA 1 has the lowest risk to the organization in terms of integrity of 
investigation data. This is important because, accurate investigation data and findings can 
directly impact the ability of the aviation community to prevent similar mishaps from 
occurring. Erroneous findings along with not accurately determining the cause of the 
mishap could lead to loss of life and equipment. Because of these issues, confidentiality 
and integrity are prioritized above availability in this case. 
It is recommended that in implementing COA 1, the USMC acquire CMDs and 
assign them directly to the squadron Aviation Safety Officer (ASO). The ASO could then 
maintain accountability of the devices and issue them on an “as needed” basis to the 
members of the aviation mishap board. It would be the responsibility of the ASO to 
maintain these CMDs and provide training on their appropriate use to the aviation mishap 
board members. 
4. Findings Summary 
Three different cases were developed in this research, and each case has been 
found to minimize risk and maximize benefit through a different implementation strategy. 
This is due to the differing requirements between the cases in terms of confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of information. This research shows that a single “best” 
implementation strategy of CMD technology for all cases does not exist. 
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research focused on the risks and benefits associated with implementing 
CMD technology. The risks and benefits were discussed both in general and with a more 
case specific focus. The confidentiality and integrity risks could change as CMD 
technology and application security improve. Therefore, future research should consider 
the state of technology at the time of implementation as well as the likely future state of 
technology in these areas. 
To maximize technology acceptance, it is recommended that future research 
survey the potential pool of users in any implementation case to determine the anticipated 
perception among those users regarding usefulness of the technology. This survey 
research could also determine the expected perceived ease of use by determining the 
personal CMD ownership among the users.  
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